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 Stumbling Uncertainly into the Digital Age: Nigeria’s 
Futile Attempts to Devise a Credible Data Protection 
Regime 
Andrew Ubaka Iwobi∗ 
Abstract: Nigeria’s progress towards becoming a full-fledged 
member of the global information society has been impeded by 
its inability to devise a credible data protection regime. This 
Article focuses on Nigeria’s recent attempts to regulate the 
processing of personal information within its jurisdiction. This 
inquiry is pursued through the analytical prism of legal 
transplantation. The Article exposes serious failings within the 
Nigerian legislative process and casts a critical eye on the 
injudicious and indiscriminate borrowing of foreign laws 
undertaken by Nigeria’s regulatory authorities in their quest to 
join the ever-growing ranks of the nations with their own data 
protection laws. This Article also provides a veritable lesson in 
the potential dangers of legal transplantation. 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 14 
II. LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION AND ITS MANIFESTATION WITHIN THE NIGERIAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM .............................................................................................. 16 
A. Legal Transplantation as a Legislative Tool ....................................... 16 
B. Colonization and Harmonization as Instruments of Legal 
Transplantation .................................................................................... 18 
C. The Feasibility of Legal Transplants ................................................... 19 
D. Legal Transplantation Within the Nigerian Legal System................. 22 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF DATA PROTECTION AS A SUBJECT OF LEGAL 
REGULATION IN NIGERIA .............................................................................. 28 
A. From Periphery to Center Stage: Nigeria’s Place in Today’s Global 
Information Society ............................................................................... 28 
B. The Law as a Mechanism for Safeguarding the Privacy of Personal 
Information: International, Regional and National Dimensions ....... 30 
IV. NIGERIA’S LEGISLATIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DATA PRIVACY AGENDA: A 
CATALOGUE OF FALSE STARTS AND DEAD ENDS .......................................... 36 
A. Overview ................................................................................................ 36 
B. The Cyber Security and Data Protection Agency Bill 2008 ................ 39 
C. The Data Protection Bill 2011 .............................................................. 40 
D. The Electronic Transactions (Establishment) Bill 2013 ..................... 42 
E. The Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (Circa 2013) ..... 48 
F. The Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015 ................... 58 
                                                          
∗ LL.B (Jos), Ph.D (Birmingham), Senior Lecturer and Course Director for the LL.M E-Commerce 
module, College of Law, Swansea University. The author is grateful to participants in the Swansea 
University Institute of Shipping and Trade Law (IISTL) Research Seminar December 2, 2015 for 
their invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
14 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 26:13 
 
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 59 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The preamble to the EU General Data Protection Regulation states that:  
Rapid technological developments and globalization have 
brought new challenges for the protection of personal data. The 
scale of the collection and sharing of personal data has 
increased significantly. Technology allows both private 
companies and public authorities to make use of personal data 
on an unprecedented scale in order to pursue their activities.1 
The rapid technological advances and globalizing tendencies that have 
swept through the European Union have also become increasingly evident in 
various parts of Africa in the past decade.2 Like the Member States of the 
European Union, African countries like Nigeria are currently grappling with 
the complex and manifold challenges to individual privacy, which have come 
to the fore in the modern information age.3 Nigeria has recently embarked on 
the task of regulating the processing of personal information within its 
technological borders.4 As part of this process, the Nigerian legal system has 
gone down the well-trodden path of legal transplantation in an effort to devise 
a sound legislative regime for the protection of such information.5 
                                                          
1 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final 5419/1/16 
(Apr. 8, 2016), pmbl. 6, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5419-2016-REV-
1/en/pdf.   
2 See Technology Will Drive Growth in Africa Over the Next Five Years, IT TECH NEWS AFRICA (Jan. 
22, 2015), http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2015/01/technology-will-drive-growth-in-africa-over-the-
next-five-years/ (“Africa is booming and a lot of this economic growth stems from investment in 
technology . . . . Nairobi [Kenya] and Lagos [Nigeria] . . . are already well on the way to becoming 
global tech hotspots.”); see also Technology in Africa the Pioneering Continent, THE ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21649516-innovation-
increasingly-local-pioneering-continent (“A continent that has long accepted technological hand-
me-downs from the West is increasingly innovating for itself . . . . Technology is opening up African 
markets that have long been closed or did not previously exist . . . . Africa’s innovation revolution 
is still in its infancy. But it is likely to gain pace.”). 
3 LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAWS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 80 (2014) (“Africa is now 
home to some of the most prescriptively ambitious data privacy initiatives”); Alex Boniface 
Makulilo, Data Protection Regimes in Africa: Too Far From the European ‘Adequacy’ Standard?, 3 
INT. DATA PRIVACY L. 42, 42 (2013) (“[After] four decades of the development of data protection 
laws, the world has witnessed data protection regimes finally arriving in Africa.”). 
4 See Alex B. Makulilo, Nigeria’s Data Protection Bill: Too Many Surprises, 120 PRIVACY L. & BUS: 
DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY INFO. WORLDWIDE 25 (2012); see also Bernard Oluwafemi Jemilohun 
& Timothy Ifedayo Akomolede, Regulations or Legislation for Data Protection in Nigeria? A Call 
for a Clear Legislative Framework, 3 GLOBAL J. OF POL. & L. RES. 1 (2015), 
http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Regulations-or-Legislation-for-Data-Protection-in-
Nigeria1.pdf. 
5 See discussion infra Parts IV.C–IV.E. 
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 The basic premise of this Article is that Nigeria’s regulatory authorities 
have utilized the mechanism of legal transplantation in the fledgling field of 
data protection in a manner that has been detrimental to the nation’s quest for 
an appropriate statutory framework. Their approach has been desultory and 
ill-conceived, and their various pieces of draft legislation reveal an alarming 
lack of in-depth knowledge of the transplanted laws and an absence of the 
sophisticated mindset needed to render those laws amenable to the Nigerian 
context. This is unfortunate because it exposes serious failings within the 
Nigerian legislative process, which will inevitably hinder the nation’s progress 
towards the legal modernization that is vital to compete with other nations in 
the highly complex and rapidly evolving technological sphere.  
This Article will explore legal transplantation in three main parts. The 
first part sets the scene by briefly explaining the phenomenon of legal 
transplantation, with particular emphasis on its importance as a mechanism 
for legislative reform, its utility within the sphere of data protection, and its 
historical and contemporary relevance within the Nigerian legal system. The 
second part examines the vital role of modern digital technologies, such as the 
internet, in the transmission of vast quantities of electronic data across the 
globe. Part two highlights Nigeria’s growing receptivity towards these new 
technologies. Nigeria is not alone in this regard. The severe threat to individual 
privacy arising from the unfettered transmission of such data has not only 
placed the protection of personal data firmly on the legislative agenda in a 
large number of countries, but has also provided the impetus for a host of 
international initiatives designed to harmonize the data protection regimes of 
these countries.6 The third section of this Article consists of a critical review of 
several pieces of draft legislation on data protection currently circulating in 
Nigeria. This review reveals their drafters have unabashedly plagiarized the 
U.K. Data Protection Act 19987 (U.K. DPA 1998) and, in one instance, the 
Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
2000.8 In the process, the Nigerian legislature has been oblivious to the 
difficulties inherent in the operation of these statutes in their original settings, 
failed to take account of significant changes that have either been made to 
these statutes or are imminent in their home jurisdictions and given very little 
thought to the suitability of these statutes within the Nigerian context. 
                                                          
6 See infra Part III.B.  
7 Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29 (Eng.) [hereinafter DPA 1998]. 
8 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C, c 5 (Can.) [hereinafter 
PIPEDA]. 
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II. LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION AND ITS MANIFESTATION WITHIN THE NIGERIAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM  
A. Legal Transplantation as a Legislative Tool 
Legal transplantation entails “the transfer of laws and institutional 
structures across geopolitical or cultural borders.”9 It has been pointed out that 
legal transplants are “commonly observed around the world . . . [and] can range 
from the wholesale adoption of entire systems of law to the copying of a single 
rule.”10 Alan Watson, who has justifiably been described as “the guru of legal 
transplants,”11 argues with characteristic boldness that one of the most 
startling and obvious characteristics of legal rules is “the apparent ease with 
which they can be transplanted from one system to another”12 and asserts that 
“massive successful borrowing is commonplace in law.”13     
This theme has also been taken up by Kahn-Freund, who points out that 
legal developments overseas have become increasingly relevant to law making 
and law reform, and that lawmakers routinely look abroad for new ideas and 
techniques.14 Kahn-Freund’s reference to the propensity of lawmakers to look 
abroad for inspiration reflects the fact that legislation has become the principal 
means by which laws are transplanted. It has accordingly been acknowledged 
that even though various institutions within a legal system may be involved in 
the transplantation of laws, such transplantation is “far more often a result of 
decisions by national legislators.”15  
Legal transplantation within the legislative arena has been portrayed in a 
positive light by various commentators who have drawn particular attention 
to the procedural efficiency that can be achieved through legislative borrowing. 
Watson has remarked in this connection, “borrowing rules and structures from 
elsewhere . . . can be the cheapest and most efficient way of changing the 
                                                          
9 JOHN GILLESPIE, TRANSPLANTING COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM: DEVELOPING A 'RULE OF LAW' IN 
VIETNAM 3 (2006).  
10 Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary 
Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 887 (2003); see also GRAHAM 
GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES 12 (2014). 
11  Helen Xanthaki, Legal Transplants in Legislation: Defusing the Trap, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
659, 660 (2008).  
12 Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J.  313, 313 (1978). 
13 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and European Private Law, 4 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (2004). 
14 Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1974) (Kahn-
Freund has been eulogized as one of the greatest jurists of the 20th century); see Otto Kahn-
Freund, 42 MOD. L. REV. 609 (1979) (his views on legal transplantation have therefore been 
accorded considerable weight in the scholarly literature on the topic).  
15 Jorg Fedtke, Legal Transplants, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 550, 550 (Jan 
M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012). 
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law.”16 Similarly, another scholar asserted, “[i]t is . . . easier and simply 
cheaper to copy an existing rule than to reinvent the wheel. In addition to 
saving part of the time and cost of drafting legislation, practical experience 
with a foreign model will often be available at no extra expense.”17 This 
dimension of legislative borrowing is also emphasized by Xanthaki, who has 
written extensively on issues pertaining to the quality of legislation and the 
transferability of legislative solutions from one legal system to another. 
Xanthaki opines that borrowing from foreign jurisdictions is a means of 
developing legislation quickly and effectively and insists that “[i]n an era of 
tight parliamentary schedule[s] where drafters are asked to produce bills at 
unprecedented speed, drafting teams must be afforded the luxury of seeking 
ready solutions with proven results elsewhere, in similar and different legal 
systems”.18  
However, Xanthanki has argued that effectiveness (rather than efficiency) 
is the principal virtue pursued by legislative drafters all over the world. 
Xanthanki asserts that “effectiveness is the platform of transferability of laws, 
institutions and legislative solutions.”19 Effectiveness in this particular context 
refers to the extent to which the observable attitudes and behaviors of the 
target population correspond to, and are the consequence of, the norms 
prescribed by the legislator.20 It is incumbent on legislators who set out to 
borrow from other legal systems to scrutinize the substantive rules and 
principles of the legislation they are seeking to transplant and the policies that 
underpin this legislation in a rigorous and painstaking manner, before it is 
formally enacted. In the absence of such scrutiny, it is highly unlikely that the 
transplanted legislation will operate effectively in its new setting. As shown 
below, the Nigerian government does not appear to have appreciated the 
importance of such scrutiny in its recent efforts to establish a legislative 
framework for the regulation of personal data.   
                                                          
16 Watson, supra note 12, at 326. 
17 Fedtke, supra note 15, at 550; see also Loukas A. Mistelis, Regulatory Aspects, Globalization, 
Harmonization, Legal Transplants, and Law Reform - Some Fundamental Observations, 34 INT’L 
LAWYER 1055, 1067 (2000) (“[t]he argument is strong that there is no need for legislators to 
struggle to reinvent the wheel when others have dealt with the same issues.”); Kanda & Milhaupt, 
supra note 10, at 889 (“legal transplants . . . are a cheap, quick and potentially fruitful source of 
new law.”). 
18 Xanthanki, supra note 11, at 661–62. 
19 Helen Xanthaki, On Transferability of Legislative Solutions: The Functionality Test, in 
DRAFTING LEGISLATION: A MODERN APPROACH 1, 16 (Constantin Stefanou & Helen Xanthaki eds., 
2008); see also Luzius Mader, Evaluating the Effects: A Contribution to the Quality of Legislation, 
22 STAT. L. REV. 119, 125–27 (2001).   
20   Xanthaki, supra note 19; Mader, supra note 19. Factors that determine the effectiveness of 
legislation include the nature of the substantive rules and principles embodied in the legislation, 
the type of language in which these rules are formulated, the manner and extent to which they 
have been communicated to the target population, and the mechanisms and procedures through 
which they are enforced. 
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B. Colonization and Harmonization as Instruments of Legal Transplantation 
Watson characterizes the process of “borrowing from another system [as] 
the most common form of legal change.”21 In bygone days, such legal change 
was often brought about through the process of conquest and colonization. This 
mode of transplantation is exemplified by the wholesale transplantation of 
English law into Nigeria by the British colonial authorities from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards.22 
Nevertheless, it is also the case that large-scale legal transfers are equally 
possible without colonization.23 A great deal of legal transplantation occurs 
voluntarily, in situations where a society’s laws have become outmoded, 
ossified, arbitrary, or abusive. Transplants may also be needed when the 
society encounters some new problem or subject matter that its existing laws 
do not address properly, thereby prompting its lawmakers to look elsewhere 
for legal edification.24 It has also been pointed out that “[o]ther . . . reasons for 
using legal transplants include the harmonization of law within the framework 
of international agreements.”25 This particular mode of legal transplantation 
is exemplified by the extensive program of legal harmonization that has taken 
place across much of present-day Europe, under the aegis of what is now the 
European Union (hereinafter the EU).26 
In fact, since the 1980s, various harmonization projects have been actively 
pursued in the field of data protection by different sub-global, regional and sub-
regional organizations.27 Commenting on this trend, Greenleaf, who is a 
leading authority on global data privacy, explains that the concept of data 
protection or data privacy “is now relatively well defined as a set of ‘data 
protection principles’, which include an internationally accepted set of 
minimum principles plus additional principles which are evolving continually 
through national laws and international agreements.”28 He also emphasizes 
that such international agreements “have contributed a great deal to 
                                                          
21 Alan Watson, Legal Change, Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1125 
(1983). 
22 See infra Part II.D. 
23 GILLESPIE, supra note 9, at 4. 
24 John Witte Jr., Canon Law in Lutheran Germany: A Surprising Case of Legal Transplantation 
in LEX ET ROMANITAS: ESSAYS FOR ALAN WATSON 181 (Michael Hoeflich ed., 2000). 
25 Fedtke, supra note 15, at 550. 
26 See Witte, supra note 24, at 182; see also Hakeem Rizk, Comment, Fundamental Right or 
Liberty? Online Privacy's Theory for Co-Existence with Social Media, 56 HOW. L.J. 951, 963 (2013) 
(“The European Union is guided by a political and economic mission to standardize the laws of all 
member countries in an effort to function as one unified market . . . .”). 
27 For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [hereinafter OECD]; 
the Council of Europe [hereinafter CoE], the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the EU, 
the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States [hereinafter ECOWAS]. 
28 GREENLEAF, supra note 10, at 5. 
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development of consistency of national data privacy laws.”29 The consistency 
alluded to by Greenleaf is indicative of the considerable amount of 
transplantation through the process of legal harmonization that has taken 
place throughout the world in the sphere of data protection in recent decades. 
It is for that reason, as he suggests, that data protection provides “an 
interesting case study” of the phenomenon of legal transplantation.30 
C. The Feasibility of Legal Transplants     
Xanthaki is critical of legislative drafters who borrow legal solutions and 
legislative texts from foreign jurisdictions and generally pay little heed to 
established theories and controversies concerning the legitimacy and 
feasibility of legal transplants. She points out that 
[t]his creates problems of inapplicability of the transplanted 
law within the receiving national legal context. In turn, 
inapplicability leads to failure of the purpose of the 
transplanted law. Failure of purpose signifies not only collapse 
of the intended regulation but also wastage of resources in 
legislating and enforcing an inevitably failing legislation and, 
perhaps more importantly, the negligent creation of the false 
or fraudulent impression that the problem is adequately 
addressed.31 
Many other scholars also vigorously dispute Watson’s core message that 
“the transplanting of legal rules is socially easy.”32 Watson considers 
transplantation to be socially easy because he firmly believes that “legal rules 
may be very successfully borrowed [even] where the relevant social, economic, 
geographical and political circumstances of the recipient are very different 
from those of the donor system,” and that “the recipient system does not 
require any real knowledge of the social, economic, geographical and political 
context of the origin and growth of the original rule.”33 Cairns, who has 
recently undertaken a wide-ranging and highly illuminating review of the 
burgeoning literature on legal transplants, observes that there have been 
persistent and regular criticisms of Watson’s work in this field and is especially 
struck by the fact that “the idea of ‘legal transplants’ or ‘transplantation of 
                                                          
29 Id. at 6; see also Alex B. Makulilo, Myth and Reality of Harmonisation of Data Privacy Policies 
in Africa, 31 COMPUT. L. & SEC.  REV. 78, 78 (2015) (“Modern technologies have made it possible 
for more personal information to cross national borders than ever before . . . . Concomitantly in 
[the] 1970s and 1980s harmonisation of data privacy policies became a policy agenda.”). 
30 GREENLEAF, supra note 10, at 12. 
31 Xanthaki, supra note 11, at 659. 
32 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 95 (2d ed. 1993).  
33 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q. REV. 79, 80–81 (1976).  
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laws’ seems so obvious to some scholars, while others remain skeptical.”34 
Cabrelli and Siems also highlight the antipathy towards Watson.35 They point 
out that culturalists, like Legrand36 have unequivocally rejected the 
Watsonian standpoint, while contextualists like Kahn-Freund have also called 
it into question.37 The disagreement between Watson and Legrand has been 
particularly pronounced. Their divergent positions are encapsulated by the 
“split between those [like Watson] who proclaim the feasibility of 
transplantation as a device of legal change, and those [like Legrand] who claim 
that they are impossible.”38  
Smits opines that Legrand’s claim that legal transplantation is impossible 
is “too radical,” and “has not been recognized as insightful”39; while Nelken 
characterizes it as “unhelpful.”40 Nelken concedes that “if by ‘legal transplants’ 
we mean the attempts to use laws and legal institutions to reproduce identical 
meanings and effects in different cultures, then this is indeed impossible.”41 
He however points out that Watson has never sought to argue otherwise, thus 
implying Legrand’s criticism of Watson was not particularly well directed. 
Nelken maintains that “[i]t can hardly be gainsaid that legal transfers are 
possible, are taking place, have taken place and will take place.”42 Similarly, 
Harding asserts that “it seems as if Watson’s theory of legal transplantation . 
. . is made out to a remarkable extent”43 and “the evidence of successful legal 
transplants of almost every conceivable kind is powerful.”44     
                                                          
34 John W. Cairns, Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 637, 639 (2013). 
35 David Cabrelli & Mathias Siems, Convergence, Legal Origins, and Transplants in Comparative 
Corporate Law: A Case-based and Qualitative Analysis, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 124–25 (2015).   
36 See generally Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
COMP. L. 109–24 (1997); Pierre Legrand, What “Legal Transplants”?, in ADAPTING LEGAL 
CULTURES 55–70 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).   
37 Kahn-Freund, supra note 14, at 13–27 (using a range of examples drawn from such disparate 
fields as family law, legal institutions, and procedures and the law of labor relations, Kahn-Freund 
seeks to illustrate the risk of rejection inherent in any attempt to transplant a pattern of law 
outside the environment of its origin).   
38 Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 10, at 889. 
39 Jan Smits, On Successful Legal Transplants in a Future Ius Commune Europaeum, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 141 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 2002). 
40 David Nelken, Comparatists and Transferability, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS 
AND TRANSITIONS 437, 442 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).  
41 Id. at 442. 
42 Id. at 443. 
43 Andrew Harding, Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South East Asia: Making 
Sense of the “Nomic Din”, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 199, 213 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest 
eds., 2001).  
44 Id. at 218–19. 
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Contextualists like Kahn-Freund have adopted a more nuanced approach. 
While not wholly averse to the notion that laws may be transplanted between 
legal systems, he does not share Watson’s conviction that such transplantation 
is easy to accomplish. Kahn-Freund asserts in this connection that there are 
varying “degrees of transferability”45 and that “we cannot take for granted that 
rules or institutions are transplantable.”46 Therefore, it is incumbent on 
legislators contemplating the use of foreign legal models “[to] ask what chances 
there are that the new law will be adjusted to the [host] environment and what 
are the risks that it will be rejected.”47 He opines that this “requires a 
knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also of its social, and above all its 
entire political, context”48 and insists that “[t]he use of comparative law for 
practical purposes becomes an abuse . . . if it . . . ignores this context of the 
law.”49 What Kahn-Freund means is that comparative law can serve as a tool 
for law reform since those who prepare new legislation often avail themselves 
of legal rules and institutions developed in foreign countries, but that if it is 
simply taken for granted that such foreign rules and institutions are 
inherently transplantable and due cognizance is not taken of the possibility 
that they may be rejected, this constitutes an abuse or misuse of the discipline 
of comparative law.  This line of reasoning has more recently been reiterated 
by Niglia who asserts that “[a]ccording to [the] line of scholarship initiated by 
Otto Kahn-Freund, a 'misuse' of the comparative law method takes place 
whenever the actors involved in the legislative process transplant foreign rules 
in their own legal system with little regard for the rules’ context.”50 Such 
misuse has occurred in the Nigerian legal system where the regulatory elite 
have uncritically adopted foreign legislation such as the Data Protection Act 
(“DPA”) 199851 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) 2000,52 without giving serious thought to the fact 
that social, economic, and political conditions in Nigeria differ substantially 
from those in England and Canada, from where these two pieces of legislation 
emanated.53  
                                                          
45 Kahn-Freund, supra note 14, at 6. 
46 Id. at 27. 
47 Id. at 6. 
48 Id. at 27. 
49 Id.  
50 Leone Niglia, Of Harmonization and Fragmentation: The Problem of Legal Transplantation in 
the Europeanization of Private Law, 17 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 116, 117 (2010). 
51 Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29 (Eng.). 
52 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5 (Can.). 
53 See infra at Parts IV.C–IV.E. 
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D. Legal Transplantation Within the Nigerian Legal System 
 The dispersal of English law to the distant corners of the British Empire, 
including the territory that eventually became the Colony and Protectorate of 
Nigeria, reflects the magnitude of transplantation.54 English law was 
introduced into the territory by Ordinance No.3 of 1863, two years after 
Nigeria’s former capital, Lagos, was formally annexed.55 Lagos served as a 
staging point for the colonization of other parts of Nigeria in the decades that 
followed. As part of this process, the 1863 Ordinance was eventually 
superseded by the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1914, which extended the 
operation of English law to the rest of Nigeria.56 This latter Ordinance provided 
that “[s]ubject to the terms of this or any other Ordinance, the common law, 
the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application which were in 
force in England on the first of January 1900, shall be in force within the 
jurisdiction of the court.”57  
The template for the reception of English law laid down in these early 
Ordinances has remained in effect in post-independent Nigeria (albeit with 
certain textual variations between the versions in force in the thirty-six states 
of the Federation). This resonates with Watson’s view that a notable 
characteristic of legal rules, when transplanted from one system or society to 
another, is the longevity that they usually exhibit within their new 
environment.58 This view is clearly borne out by the fact that even though a 
century and a half has elapsed since English law gained its first foothold in 
Nigeria, its importance has scarcely diminished in the intervening years. 
Indeed, it remains a vital source of law within the present-day Nigerian legal 
system. It is true, as McDowell makes clear, that when the main body of 
English law initially came into force in Nigeria, the colonial authorities 
ostensibly anticipated that in due course, it “would be eroded and a new system 
would be created by local legislation and local decisions.”59 In reality, the 
                                                          
54 See Bonny Ibhawoh, Stronger Than the Maxim Gun Law, Human Rights and British Colonial 
Hegemony in Nigeria, 72 AFR.: J. INT’L AFRICAN INST. 55, 59 (2002) (the pivotal role played by 
English law in the colonial subjugation of Nigeria has been well captured by this author who 
observes that “[the] process of consolidating and stabilising colonial rule was, of necessity, founded 
on law and specifically the English legal system . . . . Law, in the form of ordinances and 
proclamations . . . bec[a]me the basis of promoting British hegemony in the colony”). 
55 Ordinance No.3 of 1873, § 1 (Nigeria).  
56 Supreme Court Ordinance, Ordinance No.6 of 1914. (Nigeria).  
57Id. § 14.  
58 Watson, supra note 12, at 314. 
59 C. M. McDowell, The Interpretation of the Land Tenure Law of Northern Nigeria, 14 J. AFR. L. 
155, 155 (1970).  It was with this specific object in mind, that the reception formula in the Supreme 
Court Ordinance 1914, § 14, supra note 56, and similarly worded Nigerian statutory provisions 
enacted thereafter, (a) stipulated that the common law, Equity and English statutes of general 
application were subject to the terms of local ordinances and (b) provided a cut-off date of January 
1, 1900 in respect to these statutes. Id. 
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colonial authorities made very little progress in this direction. On the contrary, 
as Sedler points out, “during the colonial period, the sad truth is that for the 
most part, English law as administered in Africa differed very little from the 
law administered in England.”60 
The lack of progress made by colonial authorities was symptomatic of the 
transplant bias and the inertia that permeated Nigeria’s colonial and post-
colonial legal systems.61 As Watson explains, such transplant bias is present 
in situations where a legal system is inherently predisposed to foreign law 
emanating from a particular source.62 Such bias encourages a high degree of 
acceptance by the recipient legal system, which is not necessarily based on a 
thorough examination of possible alternatives.63 The extent of this bias 
depends on factors such as the existence of a shared linguistic tradition 
between the donor and recipient countries, the general prestige of the donor 
country, and the training and experiences of the legal profession in the 
recipient country.64 Such bias is often compounded by inertia on the part of the 
regulatory elites which, according to Watson, is derived from the lack of a 
sufficiently strong impulse and the absence of any sustained interest in 
seeking out and giving effect to the most satisfactory or suitable rules.65 
Watson indicates that legal systems, which do not devote adequate legislative 
time or sufficient intellectual energy to the task of counteracting such inertia, 
tend to “tolerate much law which does not correspond to what is ‘needed’ or is 
efficient.”66 As Xanthaki points out, the clearest manifestation of such 
transplant bias in the legislative sphere is the fact that when faced with the 
prospect of drafting new legislation, drafting teams instinctively look to 
countries whose legal system, language, and tradition is familiar to their own 
                                                          
60 Robert Allen Sedler, Law Reform in the Emerging Nations of Subsaharan Africa: Social Change 
and the Development of the Modern Legal System, 13 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 195, 205 (1968–69). 
61 See L.E.O ESIEMOKHAI, THE COLONIAL LEGAL HERITAGE IN NIGERIA, 21–23 (1986) (arguing that 
the colonial government encouraged young Nigerians to go to England to study law intending that 
these future Nigerian lawyers would acquire the habits, tastes, and thought patterns of their 
British counterparts and that after Nigeria’s independence, this articulate legal fraternity 
effectively ensured that there would be no sudden departure from British legal orthodoxy). See 
also Chukwuemeka G Nnona, Towards the Decolonization of African Law, in LAW, SECURITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT, COMMEMORATIVE ESSAYS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA LAW FACULTY 115, 142 
(Chukwuemeka G Nnona ed., 2013) (explaining that the Nigerian legal system has displayed "an 
unquestioning disposition toward[s] received colonial constructs, especially a failure to seriously 
and comparatively interrogate the nature and history of the colonially-derived ideas and 
infrastructure of law.").  
62 Watson, supra note 12, at 327. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 331. 
66 Id. at 332. 
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for guidance.67 In the case of Nigeria, this meant that whenever the colonial 
legislative authorities set out to enact local ordinances intended either to 
supersede pre-1900 English statutes of general application, or to deal with 
matters not covered by such pre-1900 statutes, the contents of these local 
ordinances invariably bore a close affinity to corresponding statutes enacted 
by the U.K. Parliament after January 1, 1900.68 
Gillespie remarks that in societies that have passed through the crucible 
of colonialism, it is “only after independence that a distance in legal perspective 
from the ‘motherland’ slowly begins to emerge.”69 This presupposes that the 
transplant bias exhibited by a legal system will start receding after it sheds 
the yoke of colonial bondage. In the case of Nigeria, however, even though more 
than fifty years have elapsed since it became an independent nation, it has so 
far done very little to distance itself from its Anglocentric legal antecedents 
and English law has continued to play a major role in many key spheres of 
human activity. The fundamental problem with the colonial transplant bias is 
that it is still deeply entrenched in Nigeria’s postcolonial legal system, which 
has remained excessively deferential towards the received English law in its 
eagerness to preserve its Anglocentric legal traditions. Such deference sits 
uneasily with Nigeria’s standing as an independent nation and is difficult to 
justify in an era when its political environment, social conditions, cultural 
milieu, and economic circumstances are very different from those that exist in 
British society.  
Nigeria is by no means unique in this respect, as acknowledged by Sedler, 
who indicates that upon attaining independence, African states, “retained with 
little change the structure of the legal system that was ‘inherited’ from the 
colonial rulers.”70 Sedler suggests that this was understandable and perhaps 
even desirable since the indigenous legal elite entrusted with directing the 
development of these legal systems after independence “received their training 
in whatever law made up the essential elements of [their pre-]existing 
[colonial] system.”71  
                                                          
67 Xanthaki, supra note 11, at 660. 
68 Commenting on this state of affairs, Gower explains that 
[i]n general, local legislation was unimaginative – a verbatim reception of 
English law on the same subject matter. If, for example, a colony needed a 
Business Corporations Act, the Colonial Office would dispatch a copy of the 
latest English Companies Act [which in the case of Nigeria was the Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c 69 (Eng.)] and it would be re-enacted in 
the Colony without any consideration of whether it was really appropriate to 
local conditions.  
L.C B GOWER, INDEPENDENT AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION 27–28 (1967). 
69 GILLESPIE, supra note 9, at 4. 
70 Sedler, supra note 60, at 205. 
71 Id. 
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Gower on the other hand, has been rather less sanguine about the degree 
of prominence English law continued to enjoy in countries like Nigeria after 
independence. Gower points out rather acerbically that the legal elite in these 
countries viewed English law as “the perfection of human reason” and 
therefore deluded themselves that “everything in their legal garden [was] 
lovely.”72 In the face of such complacency, he maintained that he was not 
particularly proud of the legal legacy bequeathed by Britain to her African 
colonies because English law was often applied without consideration of its 
suitability to local conditions.73 This has been the case in the Nigerian 
legislative arena where the excessively deferential attitude that has been 
displayed towards English law has led to the enactment of various statutes 
whose provisions are manifestly ill suited to local conditions and 
circumstances.   
A notable example of a Nigerian statute that has adopted rules derived 
from English law without taking proper account of local circumstances is the 
Company and Allied Matters Act.74 This Act provides that any association 
established for commercial purposes, which consists of more than twenty 
members, must be incorporated as a company. This means that under Nigerian 
law, unincorporated partnerships (other than cooperative societies and firms 
of legal practitioners or accountants) are prohibited from having more than 
twenty members.75 Nnonna, who has undertaken an in-depth study of this 
particular provision,76 explains that it can be traced back to the English 
                                                          
72 GOWER, supra note 68, at 91. 
73 Id. at 30. 
74 Company and Allied Matters Act (1999), Chapter C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010 
(Nigeria). 
75 Id. § 19, which provides as follows:  
(1) No company, association or partnership consisting of more than twenty 
persons shall be formed for the purpose of carrying on any business for profit 
or gain by the company, association, or partnership, or by the individual 
members thereof, unless it is registered as a company under this Act . . . . 
(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to - 
(a) any cooperative society registered under the provisions of the any 
enactment in force in Nigeria; or   
(b) any partnership for the purpose of carrying on practice 
i. as legal practitioners, by persons each of whom is a legal 
practitioner; or 
ii. as accountants, by persons each of whom is entitled by law to 
practice as an accountant. 
76 C George Nnona, The Prohibition of Large Partnerships in Nigerian Company Law: An Essay 
into Postcolonial Legal Atavism, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 481, 483 (2010).  
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Companies Act 194877 and the English Companies Act 1967.78 The wisdom of 
importing this particular rule of English law into Nigeria has been called into 
question by Nnona who argues that:  
Where two or more persons carry on business together with an 
expectation of profit, they are deemed to be a partnership. The 
sharing of profits from a joint enterprise is thus a prime 
indication of the existence of a partnership in law. The net 
result of this is that the provision . . . under consideration 
effectively renders illegal, myriad associations or 
arrangements under which people conduct sundry workaday 
activities . . . . A statutory provision should not proscribe 
myriad interactions that form part of the workaday life of the 
average citizen; not without a roundly considered and clearly 
articulated reason of an unassailable sort, something that is 
apparently lacking here. To do otherwise would be to 
implement legislation that is difficult to enforce [and] socially 
disruptive if enforced . . . .”79 
It is evident from Nnona’s analysis that this particular aspect of the 
received English law is not well suited to the sort of small-scale 
entrepreneurial activities that are very common in the Nigerian commercial 
environment. Indeed, the decision by Nigeria’s legislative authorities to give 
effect to this arbitrary twenty-member limit is even more difficult to justify in 
view of the fact that this restriction no longer applies within the English legal 
system where it originated.80  
Another statute that shows that Nigerian legislators are not yet adept at 
ensuring received English law is tailored to local conditions is the Nigerian 
Matrimonial Causes Act.81 One of the remedies provided in this Act is a decree 
of jactitation of marriage.82 This remedy is available to a petitioner against a 
respondent “who has falsely boasted and persistently asserted that a marriage 
has taken place between [them].”83 The eminent legal historian, Richard 
Helmholz, indicates that suits for jactitation of marriage “began to be 
entertained by the English ecclesiastical courts from at least the late fifteenth 
                                                          
77 Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c 38, § 434 (Eng.). 
78 Companies Act 1967, c 81, § 120 (Eng.). 
79 Nnona, supra note 76, at 500–01. 
80 REGULATORY REFORM (REMOVAL OF 20 MEMBER LIMIT IN PARTNERSHIPS ETC) ORDER 2002, SI 
2002/3203 (UK).  
81 Matrimonial Causes Act (1970), Chapter M7 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010 (Nigeria). 
82 Id. § 2(2)(f). 
83 Id. § 52. 
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century forwards.”84 This remained the case until the enactment of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, which deprived the ecclesiastical courts of their 
jurisdiction in matrimonial matters (including jactitation of marriage) and 
transferred this jurisdiction to the newly created Court for Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes.85 With the passage of time, this remedy has become so 
obsolete that one notable scholar has described it as part of the “dead wood” of 
English matrimonial law and as a “near-fossil” whose passing “would be 
lamented by none.”86 As far back as 1971, the Law Commission of England and 
Wales expressed the view that “the remedy of jactitation of marriage is today 
inappropriate and should be abolished.”87 This recommendation was reiterated 
by the Law Commission in 198488 and was eventually implemented by the 
English Family Law Act 1986.89 In spite of the fact that jactitation of marriage 
has been accorded legislative recognition in Nigeria, as it once was in England 
and in various other former British colonies, a perusal of the leading textbook 
on Nigerian family law reveals the remedy has merited only two very brief 
paragraphs. Moreover, there have been no known cases in which the remedy 
has been pursued in the Nigerian courts.90 This suggests that this antiquated 
remedy is completely redundant in the Nigerian context and that its inclusion 
in the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Act was unwarranted. This impression is 
reinforced by the fact that the remedy has been discarded in England where it 
originated and in various other jurisdictions where it once applied.  
Even though many years have elapsed since the Nigerian Matrimonial 
Causes Act and the Company and Allied Matters Act were enacted, it seems 
that Nigeria’s legislative authorities are still very much under the influence of 
the received English law. As shown in greater detail below, this is evident from 
the cavalier manner in which the current Nigerian National Assembly has 
sought to incorporate key provisions of the U.K. DPA into its draft legislation 
                                                          
84 R. H. Helmholz, Canonical Remedies in Medieval Marriage Law: The Contributions of Legal 
Practice, 1 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J. 647, 654 (2003). 
85 Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c 85, § 2, § 6 (Eng.).  
86 H. A. Finlay, Jactitation and Restitution of Conjugal Rights: An Epitaph, 11 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 
264 (1973–74).  
87 The Law Commission, Published Working Paper No. 34: Jactitation of Marriage, 8 (1971) (Eng.); 
see also ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS ACT (DRA) PHASE 1, FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS: OBSOLETE ACTIONS 67–68, (1993) (arguing that actions for jactitation of marriage 
were “virtually unknown to Canadian jurisprudence,” had “clearly outlived their usefulness” and 
should therefore be abolished in the Canadian province of Alberta). 
88 See The Law Commission, Family Law: Declaration in Family Matters, L.C No.132, paras. 4.1–
4.11 (1984) (Eng.).  
89 Family Law Act, 1986, c 55, § 61 (Eng.). The remedy has also been abolished in other jurisdictions 
such as Australia and Ireland. See Family Law Act, (1975), (Cth) ch 53, § 8(2) (Austl.); Family Law 
Act, 1995, (Act No. 26/1995), § 34 (Ir.).  
90 See E.I. NWOGUGU, FAMILY LAW IN NIGERIA 250 (3d ed. 2014). 
28 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 26:13 
 
on data protection without undertaking any meaningful inquiry into their 
suitability to local conditions or the feasibility of seeking alternatives.   
III. THE EMERGENCE OF DATA PROTECTION AS A SUBJECT OF LEGAL 
REGULATION IN NIGERIA 
A. From Periphery to Center Stage: Nigeria’s Place in Today’s Global 
Information Society 
Since the internet entered the public domain in the early 1990s, it has 
emerged as the main platform for the acquisition and exchange of information 
within the global arena. From the outset, internet usage was very heavily 
skewed in favor of the technologically advanced nations of the world. 
Commentators like Cullen refer to the emergence of a “digital divide” within 
the global community, which she attributed to the gap between the developed 
and underdeveloped world in the uptake of this new technology.91  
Nigeria was a prime example of a country that, for many years, found itself 
on the wrong side of the digital divide. Until recently, there was surprisingly 
little online activity emanating from Nigeria despite the fact that it has one of 
the largest populations in the world, earns vast revenues as a major oil 
producer, and is Africa’s largest economy.92 Adomi, who has written 
extensively on the use of electronic information resources in Nigeria, reports 
that the web only became available in Nigeria in 1996 and that by the time full 
internet access was introduced in 1998, the nation had just a few dial-up email 
providers and a couple of internet service providers offering slow links to their 
subscribers.93  
The Nigerian government was characteristically lethargic in its initial 
response to the onset of the internet revolution. It was not until 2001 that the 
government formulated a National Information Technology Policy and 
established the National Information Technology Development Agency 
(“NITDA”) to implement this policy and coordinate the development of 
                                                          
91 Rowena Cullen, The Digital Divide: A Global and National Call to Action, 21 ELECTRONIC 
LIBR. 247, 247 (2003), http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/02640470310480506. 
See also Pippa Norris, The Worldwide Digital Divide: Information Poverty, the Internet and 
Development, Paper for the Ann. Meeting of the Pol. Stud. Ass’n of the UK (Apr. 12, 2000), 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/psa2000dig.pdf (Norris stated that at the dawn of 
the new millennium, the (then) twenty-nine OECD nations which constituted the bulk of the 
world’s post-industrial economies contained ninety-seven percent of all Internet hosts, ninety-two 
percent of the market in production and consumption of computer hardware, software and services, 
and eighty-six percent of all Internet users, while all of sub-Saharan Africa had just 2.5 million 
internet users). 
92 See LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD & TOMAS F HUSTED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NIGERIA: CURRENT 
ISSUES AND U.S POLICY, REPORT, 1 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33964.pdf.   
93 Esharenana E. Adomi, Internet Development and Connectivity in Nigeria, 39 PROGRAM 257, 
259 (2005), http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/00330330510610591. 
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information technology in Nigeria.94 Among the Agency’s key objectives, as set 
out in the policy, were  “[t]o promote legislation (Bills & Acts) for the protection 
of on-line,[sic] business transactions, privacy and security”95 and “to enhance 
freedom and access to digital information at all levels while protecting 
privacy.”96 Although there was a gradual expansion in internet usage in the 
years after NITDA was established, it was estimated that by 2005 there were 
still fewer than five million internet users in Nigeria, which represented less 
than four percent of the population.97 Adomi was therefore correct when he 
observed that Nigeria was “one of the slumbering giants of the African internet 
world.”98   
More recently, Nigeria’s telecommunications sector has been 
revolutionized and liberalized by the introduction of the Global System of 
Mobile Communication (“GSM”) technology needed to support the nation’s new 
mobile telephone infrastructures.99 Today, there are a number of mobile phone 
companies offering wireless access to the internet at competitive rates. In 
addition, a wide range of affordable internet-enabled smartphones, tablets, 
and other handheld digital devices have flooded the Nigerian market in recent 
years.100 These developments have produced a massive surge in internet usage 
beginning in 2008 when there was an increase from just under ten million the 
previous year to nearly twenty-four million.101 Since then, an ever-increasing 
number of Nigerians have become progressively more adept at navigating the 
digital environment. The Nigerian Communication Commission recently 
                                                          
94 See FED. GOV’T OF NIGERIA, NIGERIAN NAT’L POL’Y ON INFO. TECH. (IT) (2001), 
http://www.researchictafrica.net/countries/nigeria/Nigerian_National_Policy_for_Information_Te
chnology_2000.pdf [hereinafter POLICY ON INFO TECH]. 
95 Id. at iv. (the legislative aspect of NITDA’s mandate has subsequently been statutorily  endorsed 
by the Nigerian National Information Technology Development Act (2007)); Chapter N156 Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria 2010, § 6 (l) (Nigeria), http://www.nitda.gov.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/NITDA-act-2007.pdf (providing that the Agency’s functions include 
advising  the Government “on ways of promoting the development of information technology in 
Nigeria including introducing appropriate information technology legislation”)).  
96 See POLICY ON INFO TECH, supra note 94, at 32.  
97 See Internet Live Stats, Nigerian Internet Users, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-
users/nigeria/. 
98 Adomi, supra note 93, at 257. 
99 See Esharenana E. Adomi, Mobile Telephony in Nigeria, 22 LIBR. HI TECH NEWS 18, 18 (2005), 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/07419050510604648. 
100 See e.g. Adam Clayton Powell III, Gallup/BBG Survey: ‘Massive’ Increase in Mobile Phone, 
Internet Use in Nigeria, U. S.CAL Centre on Public Diplomacy Blog, Aug 16, 2012, 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/gallup_bbg_survey_massive_increase_in_mobile_phone_intern
et_use_in_nigeria.  
101 See Internet Live Stats, supra note 97.  
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announced that by September 2015 users browsing the Internet through 
Nigeria’s GSM networks alone had exceeded ninety-seven million.102  
B. The Law as a Mechanism for Safeguarding the Privacy of Personal 
Information: International, Regional and National Dimensions  
Regulating the internet comes with a number of problems, as emphasized 
by Lim who argues that “[a]s was the case of previous technological revolutions 
throughout history, the law has been and will continue to be, stretched to its 
practical and theoretical limits in its efforts to overcome the challenges raised 
by the Internet.”103 The fact that society is now beset by the sort of challenges 
alluded to by Lim, clearly reveals that while the digital revolution undoubtedly 
has many positive aspects, it also has its less palatable dimensions. The 
double-edged nature of modern digital technology has been emphasized by the 
Global Commission on Internet Governance (“GCIG”), which explains that 
because the internet is “capable of communicating and storing almost 
unimaginable volumes of data online, including data that can be associated 
with each of us individually . . . [it] can be used for good or ill.”104 On the one 
hand, the advent of the internet and allied technologies has rendered it 
infinitely easier, considerably cheaper, and altogether more convenient for 
governmental, commercial, and voluntary organizations all over the world to 
accumulate, hold, and disseminate vast amounts of information for a variety 
of useful and legitimate purposes. On the other hand, many of these 
organizations have developed an almost insatiable appetite for personal 
information and have become adept at prying into the private affairs of 
individuals in their relentless quest for such information. The insidious nature 
of this phenomenon is reflected in the dystopian imagery employed by 
commentators, such as Murray, who speak of modern digital technology being 
deployed in an Orwellian fashion to monitor, manage and control the actions 
of the populace.105    
The grim specter of modern information technology being exploited in such 
an intrusive manner has become a major conundrum within the legal arena 
                                                          
102 S e e  NCC Says Nigeria Internet Users Rise to 97m, METRO WATCH (Nigeria), 
http://metrowatchonline.com/ncc-says-nigeria-internet-users-rise-to-97m (last visited Oct. 1, 
2016); see also Nigeria: Mobile Internet Users Rise to 97.2 Mln, IT NEWS AFRICA, 
http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2015/11/nigeria-mobile-internet-users-rise-to-97-2-mln/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2016).   
103 YEE FEN LIM, CYBERSPACE LAW: COMMENTARIES AND MATERIALS 1 (Trischa Baker ed., 2d ed. 
2007). 
104 GLOBAL COMM’N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, TOWARD A SOCIAL COMPACT FOR DIGITAL 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 3 (2015), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150415GCIG2.p
df [hereinafter GCIG]. 
105 Andrew D. Murray, Should States Have a Right to Informational Privacy?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 191 (Andrew D. Murray & Mathias Klang eds., 2005).  
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with particular attention paid to the severe threat to individual privacy posed 
by the unfettered collection, inappropriate use, and indiscriminate transfer of 
personal information. The magnitude of the problem was highlighted at a fairly 
early stage by Lord Hoffman, the eminent U.K. Law Lord, who declared in the 
case of R v. Brown that: 
[O]ne of the less welcome consequences of the information 
technology revolution has been the ease with which it has 
become possible to invade the privacy of the individual . . . . 
Vast amounts of information about everyone are stored on 
computers capable of transmission anywhere in the world and 
accessible at the touch of a keyboard. The right to keep oneself 
to oneself, to tell other people that certain things are none of 
their business, is now under technological threat.106     
Such concerns have not receded with the passage of time and the European 
Parliament recently pointed out that “[t]he growing globalization of data flows, 
via social networks, cloud computing, search engines, location-based services, 
etc., [has] increase[d] the risk that people can lose control of their own data.” 107 
The Nigerian population has become increasingly exposed to the sort of risk 
that has been highlighted by the European Parliament. This is because the use 
of search engines to navigate the internet is now very widespread in Nigeria,108 
numerous Nigerians have become avid and active social networkers,109 and 
providers of cloud computing services are making steady inroads into the 
Nigerian market.110  
Similar concerns have also been expressed by the GCIG, which emphasizes 
that trust in the internet is being eroded by the non-transparent manner vast 
amounts of private information is collected, centralized, integrated, and 
analyzed. GCIG maintains that in order to restore trust and enhance 
confidence, “fundamental human rights, including privacy and personal data 
protection, must be protected online” and “threats to these core human rights 
should be addressed by governments and other stakeholders acting both within 
their own jurisdictions and in cooperation.”111    
                                                          
106 R v. Brown [1996] AC 543 at 556 (Eng.). 
107 EU Data Protection, INTELLIGENCE IN SCI., www.iscintelligence.com/tema.php?id=13 (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2016). 
108 See Obiora Nwosu & Isaac Anyira, The Use of Google and Yahoo by Internet Users in Nigeria, 
LIBRARY PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE (E-JOURNAL) 10 (2012) 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1892&context=libphilprac.  
109 See AFRICA PRACTICE, THE SOCIAL MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN NIGERIA 4–6 (2014), 
http://www.africapractice.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Africa-Practice-Social-Media-
Landscape-Vol-1.pdf.  
110 See Gareth van Zyl, Nigeria to Overtake SA to Become Africa’s Cloud Computing Powerhouse, 
ITWEBAFRICA (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.itwebafrica.com/cloud/516-africa/231969-nigeria-to-
overtake-sa-to-become-africas-cloud-computing-powerhouse.    
111 GCIG, supra note 104, at 1–2.  
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At the same time, however, even the most ardent privacy advocates have 
been pragmatic enough to appreciate the futility of trying to reverse the 
modern technological trends that precipitated the modern-day explosion of 
digital information. Instead, over the years, their efforts have largely been 
directed at deploying the law as an instrument for regulating rather than 
proscribing the processing of personal information. As Schartum remarks,  
Even though ICT may be used to reduce, even destroy, privacy, 
the same technologies almost always have a number of 
applications that lie well within the boundaries of what is 
regarded as acceptable - even from an information privacy 
point of view. Thus, information privacy and data protection 
are not expressions of a Luddite approach to technology, but 
rather about striking the right balance of interests by 
examining the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable 
use of ICT in different social contexts. This balance is 
formulated and implemented by means of regulation.112 
Since the United States passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1970, 
when computing was still in its infancy, numerous other nations have gone 
down the path of legal regulation of data processing by enacting legislation 
designed to protect personal information and safeguard the privacy of their 
citizens. Greenleaf, who in recent years has meticulously kept track of these 
nations, initially identified seventy-five nations in 2011.113 Further inquiries 
undertaken revealed that the number had risen to 101 countries in September 
2013114 and 109 in 2015.115  
At the same time, however, it is important to emphasize that because 
cyberspace is essentially a borderless environment, the regulation of data 
privacy has never been seen as the exclusive preserve of national governments. 
The global nature of the modern communication network has, in recent 
decades, resulted in a torrential flow of personal data across national 
boundaries.116 The emergence of this global information network has 
                                                          
112 Dag Wiese Schartum, Designing and Formulating Data Protection Laws, 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. 
TECH. 1, 4 (2010). 
113 Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy in a Networked World, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET, 221, 224. (I. Brown, ed., 2012), 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1954296.  
114 Graham Greenleaf, Sheherezade and the 101 Data Privacy Laws: Origins, Significance and 
Global Trajectories, 23 J. L. INFO. & SCI. 4, 39 (2014). 
115 Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws 2015: 109 Countries, with European Laws Now 
in a Minority, 133 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 1, 14–17 (2015).  
116 This trend was already clearly discernible as far back as 1983, when Yarn observed that, 
[T]he transfer of information across . . . boundaries is a phenomenon which 
predates written language. In today's world of satellites and computers, 
however, this flow of information has taken on added importance. The merger 
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inevitably meant that, in addition to the numerous national data privacy 
regimes that individual countries have introduced into their respective 
territories over the years, various international, regional, and sub-regional 
organizations have assumed a major role in shaping and defining how privacy 
is to be protected in the modern electronic age.  
Commenting on this development, Kraus observes “[i]n the early 1980s 
there was an international movement for the intercontinental protection of 
personal data.”117 Greenleaf also remarks that “[i]nternational agreements 
concerning data protection have had a considerable influence on adoption of 
data privacy laws for thirty years.”118 The first notable step in this direction 
was taken in 1980, when the OECD produced a set of voluntary Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows.119 A year later, 
the CoE went down the same route when it introduced its Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data (Convention 108).120 Many of the member states of the CoE who ratified 
Convention 108 also happened to be members of the EU. One notable 
consequence of this is that the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995 (EU 
DPD),121 which Greenleaf describes as the most influential international 
instrument on data privacy and which has served as the model for data 
protection legislation in many nations of the world, developed partly out of this 
Convention.122  
                                                          
of previously disparate telecommunications and computer technologies has 
resulted in an "information technology" which reduces vast quantities of 
information to computer data, transferring it to points on earth and in space 
at remarkable speeds. 
Douglas Yarn, The Development of Canadian Law on Transborder Data Flows, 13 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 825, 825 (1983). 
117 Jennifer L. Kraus, On the Regulation of Personal Data Flows in Europe and the United States, 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 59, 67 (1993). 
118 Greenleaf, supra note 113, at 22.   
119 See Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development [OECD], Recommendation of the 
Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, O.E.C.D. Doc. (C (80) 58 Final) (Oct. 1, 1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981). 
Although Nigeria is not an OECD member state, these Guidelines have had an indirect influence 
in the Nigerian setting. In particular, the ten privacy principles set out in PIPEDA, supra note 8, 
sch.1, are derived from these Guidelines and these ten principles have been reproduced virtually 
word for word in the Schedule to Nigeria’s Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), 
which will be examined in greater detail below.    
120 See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. T.S. No. 108, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 377 (1981). 
121 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard of Oct. 24, 1995 to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.  
122 Greenleaf, supra note 113, at 22. Even though Nigeria is not an EU Member State and has 
never been under any treaty obligations to approximate its nascent data protection regime to this 
particular aspect of the EU’s acquis communautaire, the indirect influence of the EU DPD within 
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With particular reference to African developments, the ECOWAS (of which 
Nigeria is a leading member) took the first tentative steps towards enacting its 
own sub-regional data privacy regime in October 2008 when ministers agreed 
on the text of what became the Supplementary Act on Data Protection within 
ECOWAS.123 This supplementary Act was formally adopted by the 
Community’s supreme organ, the authority of the heads of state and 
government in February 2010. Commenting on this instrument, Greenleaf 
indicates that it “establishes the content required of a data privacy law in each 
ECOWAS member state, including the composition of a data protection 
authority” and points out that all these requirements “are influenced very 
strongly by the EU Data Protection Directive.”124    
Under the ECOWAS Supplementary Act, each member state of the 
community is directed to “establish a legal framework of protection for privacy 
of data relating to the collection, processing, transmission, storage, and use of 
personal data”125 and to “establish its own [independent] data protection 
Authority . . . responsible for ensuring that personal data is processed in 
compliance with the provisions of this Supplementary Act.”126 In addition, the 
Supplementary Act elaborates on the composition, powers, and responsibilities 
of these data protection authorities127 and sets out key principles guiding the 
processing of personal data.128 The Supplementary Act also contains specific 
provisions relating to the processing of data, which under the EU data 
protection regime would be categorized as sensitive personal data.129 The 
Supplementary Act also legislates against the transfer of personal data to non-
ECOWAS member states that do not offer an adequate level of protection in 
relation to the processing of such data.130 It also confers a number of rights on 
individuals whose personal data is being processed131 and imposes various 
                                                          
the Nigerian legislative sphere is evident from the fact that this harmonizing Directive was 
implemented in the U.K. by means of the DPA 1998, supra note 7. Various key provisions of this 
U.K. statute have been incorporated almost verbatim into such draft Nigerian legislation as the 
Data Protection Bill 2011 and the Electronic Transactions (Establishment) Bill 2013, both of which 
will be considered further below.  
123 ECOWAS, Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS, Feb. 16, 2010, 
ECOWAS A/SA.1/01/10.  
124 GREENLEAF, supra note 113, at 26–27.   
125 ECOWAS, Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection, art. 2. 
126 Id. at art. 14. 
127 Id. at arts.15–21. 
128 Id. at arts. 23–29. 
129 Id. at arts. 30–31. 
130  ECOWAS, Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection, art 36. 
131 Id. at arts. 38–41. 
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obligations on personal data controllers engaged in the processing of such 
data.132 
At the continental level, the African Union adopted a Convention on Cyber 
Security and Personal Data Protection in 2014.133 This Convention sets out to 
strengthen the legislation relating to various aspects of digital technology in 
its Member States and to harmonize and co-ordinate their efforts at cyber-
regulation.134 Just as Greenleaf pointed out with reference to the ECOWAS 
regime, O’Donoghue indicates that many analysts believe that the data privacy 
regime embodied in Chapter II of the Convention “seeks to replicate the 
European Union data protection model whereby each country has its own 
national data protection laws and authority.”135 Greenleaf, for his part, regards 
the adoption of the Convention as the most notable global data protection 
development in 2014 and states that “[i]t is of great potential significance 
because the African Union has 54 member states, but its actual significance 
depends on accessions and ratifications, and as yet there are none.”136 
                                                          
132 Id. at arts. 42–45. 
133 Afr. Union, African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, 
EX.CL/846(XXV), (June 27, 2014).  
134 See Afr. Union, Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal 
Framework for Cyber Security in Africa, http://www.au.int/en/cyberlegislation (“The Draft 
Convention . . . seeks to harmonize African cyber legislations [sic] on electronic commerce 
organization, personal data protection, cyber security promotion and cyber crime control [and] . . .  
also to strengthen existing legislations [sic] in Member States and the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) on the Information and Communication Technologies.”) (last visited Oct 1, 
2016).  
135 Cynthia  O’Donoghue, New Data Protection Laws in Africa, TECHNOLOGY LAW DISPATCH (Feb. 
19, 2015), http://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2015/02/regulatory/new-data-protection-laws-
in-africa/. This is particularly evident from art. 8 (which commits each Member State to 
establishing a legal framework aimed at strengthening the protection of personal data and 
preventing violations of privacy arising from the collection, processing, transmission and storage 
of such data); and arts. 11–12 (which require member states to establish their own independent 
national personal data protection authorities and specify the duties and powers of these 
authorities).  Other notable elements of the Convention’s data protection are: (a) the set of basic 
principles governing the processing of personal data (art. 13); (b) the more specific principles 
governing the processing of sensitive personal data (art. 14); (c) the restrictions imposed on the 
transfer of personal data to non-African Union member states that do not ensure an adequate level 
of protection (art. 14(6)); (d) the rights conferred on data subjects (arts. 16–19) and (e) the 
obligations imposed on personal data controllers (arts. 20–23); see also Makulilo, supra note 29, at 
81–82 (explaining the key features of the Convention). 
136 Greenleaf, supra note 114, at 5.  
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IV. NIGERIA’S LEGISLATIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DATA PRIVACY AGENDA: A 
CATALOGUE OF FALSE STARTS AND DEAD ENDS 
A. Overview 
Kusamotu observed in 2007 that “[t]he Nigerian economy and technology 
are both on the up-surge, but as yet are at levels that do not lead to a significant 
awareness of privacy issues in data processing,” and noted in particular that 
“there ha[d] not been any significant ground-swell clamoring for EU-style data 
protection law in Nigeria.”137 Despite the fact that Nigeria has experienced 
exponential increases in internet usage and is now awash with PCs, laptops, 
and other internet-enabled devices, it still has not joined the swelling ranks of 
the world’s countries that have enacted their own data privacy laws.138 In 
Africa alone there were, at the last count, seventeen such countries139 and 
Nigeria’s conspicuous absence from the fold has been commented upon by 
Makulilo who points out that “[a]s most of the countries which have so far 
adopted data protection are relatively weak economically and politically, the 
spotlight will increasingly be put on Nigeria as one of the most economically 
and politically significant countries in Africa still without a data protection 
law.”140  
The fact that there has not yet been any discernible urgency on the part of 
the Nigerian government to enact its own data privacy regime is highly 
surprising for several reasons. First, constitutional democracy has at last 
taken root in Nigeria, and the right to privacy happens to be one of the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Nigeria’s current Constitution.141 Even 
though there is no specific right to the protection of personal data of the type 
provided for in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,142 the broader 
formulation in section 37 of the Constitution clearly encompasses this right.   
                                                          
137 Ayo Kusamotu, Privacy Law and Technology in Nigeria: The Legal Framework will not Meet 
the Test of Adequacy as Mandated by Article 25 of European Union Directive 95/46, 16 INFO. & 
COMM. TECH. L. 149, 156 (2007). 
138 See Peter C. Obutte, ICT Laws in Nigeria: Planning and Regulating a Societal Journey into the 
Future, 17 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 419, 438 (2014) (“[t]he huge possibilities and benefits 
that accompany ICT deployment have been obscured by an indifference to appropriate regulation 
on privacy. ICT in Nigeria is developing without a legal framework to protect the privacy of 
individuals in this rapidly evolving ICT environment.”).     
139 See Greenleaf, supra note 114, at 3. 
140 Makulilo, supra note 4, at 25. 
141 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) § 37 (Nigeria) (“The privacy of citizens, 
their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby 
guaranteed and protected.”). For a more detailed analysis of this constitutional right, see E.S 
Nwuche, The Right to Privacy in Nigeria, 1 CENTER FOR AFR. LEGAL STUD. REV. OF NIG. L. & PRACT. 
83–89 (2006).   
142 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8(1), Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 
364) 1 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”). 
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Secondly, as Makulilo points out, by virtue of Nigeria’s membership of 
ECOWAS, “it has an obligation to adopt a data protection law in conformity 
with the ECOWAS Supplementary Act . . . .”143 This is because Article 9(4) of 
the Revised ECOWAS Treaty stipulates that a decision of the authority of the 
heads of state and government “shall be binding on the member states and 
institutions of the Community.”144 The binding effect of such decisions is 
reflected in Articles 47 and 48 of the Supplementary Act, which deal with the 
publication and entry into force of the Supplementary Act. Article 47 stipulates 
that,  
This Supplementary Act shall be published by the Commission 
in the Official Journal of the Community within thirty (30) 
days of signature by the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government. It shall equally be published by each Member 
State in its national Gazette thirty (30) days after notification 
by the Commission.145 
Article 48 goes on to provide that “this Supplementary Act shall enter into 
force upon publication in the Official Journal of the Community and in the 
Official Gazette of each Member State.”146 Because the Supplementary Act was 
signed by the Authority of Heads of State and Government on February 16, 
2010, the procedure prescribed in Articles 47 and 48 meant that it should have 
been published by the Commission in the Official Journal of the Community 
by March 18, 2010, and by each Member State in its Official Gazette by April 
17, 2010, at which point it should have entered into force. It might have been 
expected, in the light of these provisions that all ECOWAS Member States, 
including Nigeria, would have proceeded without undue delay either to enact 
national data protection laws modeled on the Supplementary Act or to recast 
any data protection laws they might already have enacted to bring them into 
line with the new ECOWAS regime. It is somewhat ironic that the very 
meeting at which the heads of state endorsed this instrument took place in the 
Nigerian capital, Abuja, and was presided over by the nation’s then acting 
president, Goodluck Jonathan, who was also one of the signatories. Nigeria 
might therefore have been expected to be in the vanguard of West African 
nations seeking to give effect to this instrument through their domestic 
legislative processes.  
Thirdly, Makulilo emphasizes that “a powerful driver of the development 
of privacy law among developing countries is the desire to engage in global e-
Commerce” and that “undoubtedly this has been the paramount motivation for 
                                                          
143 Makulilo, supra note 4, at 25.  
144 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (July 24, 1993), art. 9(4), 35 
I.L.M. 660, 669 (1996). 
145 ECOWAS, Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection, art. 47. 
146 Id. at art. 48. 
38 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 26:13 
 
the adoption of data privacy legislation in Africa.”147 In the case of Nigeria, as 
Ambassador Michel Arrion, the Head of the EU Delegation to Nigeria, recently 
pointed out, the EU is the nation’s most important trade partner and its 
biggest market for both oil and non-oil exports.148 EU trading operations have 
increasingly begun to use electronic processes, which often entail the transfer 
of personal data to destinations outside the EU. The EU DPD permits such 
transfers to a non-EU Member State only where it ensures an adequate level 
of protection or where adequate privacy safeguards are imposed on the non-
EU recipient of the data (e.g. by means of appropriately worded contractual 
provisions or binding corporate rules).149  
In order to ensure that its trading arrangements with various EU Member 
States are not hindered unduly by these adequacy requirements, Nigeria 
might have been expected to treat the issue of data protection as a matter of 
legislative priority.   
This expectation has become more intense because other major sub-
Saharan economies like Ghana and South Africa, which are in fierce 
competition with Nigeria to make inroads into the highly lucrative EU 
markets, have now enacted their own well drafted and fairly comprehensive 
data protection statutes.150 Nigeria, by contrast, has been very slow to   
legislate for data privacy, prompting some authors to assert that                         
[a]s a developing economy that is eager to be placed on the 
same map with the economically advanced nations of the 
world, the realities on [the] ground mandate that . . . Nigeria 
should have adequate legislation to protect information 
especially in the terrain of electronic commercial transactions. 
Till date, Nigeria does not have any data protection legislation 
that is comparable to that in operation in other countries . . . . 
As a matter of fact, there is no federal or state enactment of 
                                                          
147 Makulilo, supra note 29, at 79. 
148 See Hakeem Jimo, Speech Delivered by Ambassador Michel Arrion at the EU-Nigeria Business 
Forum (Sep. 23, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/lifestyle/158022/speech-delivered-by-ambassador-michel-arrion-
at-the-eu-niger.html).  
149 EU DPD, arts. 25–26. 
150 Protection of Personal Information Act (Act No. 4/2013) (S.Afr.), 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2013-004.pdf; see Pamela Stein, South Africa Adopts 
Comprehensive Privacy Law, 126 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 1, 3–4 (2013); Mark J. Calaguas, 
South African Parliament Enacts Comprehensive Data Protection Law: An Overview of the 
Protection of Personal Information Bill, AFR. L. 
TODAY (2013), http://works.bepress.com/mark_calaguas/15/ (both of which examine the scope and 
highlight key aspects of the South African legislation); see also Data Protection Act  (Act No. 
843/2012) (Ghana), 
https://www.dataprotection.org.gh/sites/default/files/Data%20Protection%20Act%20%2C%202012
%20%28Act%20843. 
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legislation that has the protection of personal data as its main 
object within the Nigerian legislative framework.151 
Nigeria’s legislative efforts have only spawned a motley assortment of 
poorly conceived, inexpertly drafted, and far from comprehensive bills that are 
ill-attuned to emerging trends, rapid changes, and regulatory complexities 
inherent in data protection. This Article examines these bills in roughly 
chronological order to substantiate this admittedly harsh assessment of 
Nigeria’s legislative attempts. 
B. The Cyber Security and Data Protection Agency Bill 2008  
The Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill represents one of the Nigerian 
Legislature’s earliest attempts to regulate the online activities of its citizenry. 
One of the bill’s primary aims was to establish the Cyber Security and 
Information Protection Agency.152 To satisfy the ECOWAS Supplementary Act 
and the African Union Convention, any data protection regime enacted for 
Nigeria must be administered by an independent data protection authority.153 
A perusal of the Bill, however, reveals that the members of the Cyber Security 
and Information Protection Agency were mainly government functionaries, 
making the Agency far from an independent authority.154 Furthermore the key 
functions of the Agency, as prescribed by the Bill, bear no relationship to the 
type of matters that ordinarily fall within the remit of most data protection 
authorities.155  
When this bill is read in its entirety, it is evident that it was not intended 
to be the harbinger of a new data protection regime in Nigeria. Instead, the bill 
prescribes a wide range of criminal offenses relating to the misuse of 
computers,156 imposes certain duties on internet and communication service 
providers,157 and empowers the Nigerian president to designate certain 
computer systems and communication networks as part of the nation’s critical 
information structure.158 The inclusion of the phrases “Data Protection” in the 
                                                          
151 Jemilohun & Akomolede, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
152 Cyber Security and Data Protection Agency Bill, H.B. 154 (2008) § 1(1) (Nigeria). 
153 See ECOWAS Supplementary Act, on Personal Data Protection, art. 14; African Union 
Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, supra note 133, at arts. 11–12. 
154 See Cyber Security and Data Protection Agency Bill, H.B. 154 (2008) § 2 (Nigeria). 
155 Id. § 4. 
156 Id. §§ 7−8 (unlawful access to computers and unauthorized disclosure of computer passwords 
and access codes); §§ 9−10 (fraudulent electronic messages and other forms of computer fraud); §§ 
11−12 (interference with computer networks and misuse of electronic devices); §§ 19−20 
(cybersquatting and other computer-based violations of intellectual property rights); § 20 
(cyberterrorism); § 22 (cybergrooming and child pornography). 
157 Id. §§ 15, 17. 
158 Cyber Security and Data Protection Agency Bill, H.B. 154 (2008) § 24 (Nigeria). 
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title of the bill and “Information Protection” in the name of the agency is thus 
utterly redundant and wholly misleading.    
C. The Data Protection Bill 2011 
The substantive provisions of this Bill are closely based on the U.K. DPA 
1998.159 In R (On the application of Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis and another, Lord Sumption recently described the DPA 1998 as a 
statute of general application.160 As seen above, the statutory formula for the 
reception of English law into Nigeria provided that “the common law, the 
doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application which were in force 
in England on the first of January 1900 shall be in force [in Nigeria].”161 This 
suggests that if the legal problems the DPA 1998 seeks to address had existed 
in the nineteenth century and if the DPA had been enacted before the first of 
January 1900, it would have been one of the acts of the U.K. Parliament 
received by Nigeria alongside the common law and principles of equity.  
The Data Protection Bill 2011 (“the Bill”) consists of just eleven sections, 
with section 10 being the definition section and section eleven merely setting 
out its short title. The DPA 1998, by contrast, consists of seventy-five sections 
and sixteen lengthy schedules.162 This marked disparity reflects the fact that 
the Bill merely scratches the surface, is highly selective in its coverage, and 
does not do justice to the complexity, technicality and constantly evolving 
nature of the modern data privacy agenda.  
Section 1 of the Bill sets out the principles governing the handling of 
personal data.163 These principles are virtually identical to the eight data 
protection principles contained in the DPA 1998.164 However, the Bill does not 
provide the type of guidance on the interpretation of these principles that is 
contained in the DPA 1998.165 Moreover, under the bill, the all-important 
principle that data must be processed “fairly and lawfully”166 is not 
underpinned by any provisions of the type that are found in Schedules 2 and 3 
of the DPA 1998 concerning the procurement of the data subject’s consent or 
any of the other alternative conditions that must be present for data to be 
adjudged to have been lawfully processed. 
                                                          
159 Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011) (Nigeria); Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29 (Eng.). 
160 R v. Comm’r. of Police of the Metro. [2015] UKSC 9, para. 12 (Eng.). 
161 See Supreme Court Ordinance, Ordinance No.6 of 1914, § 19 (Nigeria). 
162 Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29 (Eng.). 
163 Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011), § 1 (Nigeria). 
164 Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, sched.1 Part I (Eng.). 
165 Id. at sched.1, Part II. 
166 Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, scheds. 2 & 3 (Eng.). 
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Other key provisions of the Bill confer a variety of rights on the data 
subject. These include the right of access to any personal data relating to the 
data subject that is being processed by or on behalf of a data controller,167 the 
right to require data controllers to cease to process such personal data,168 the 
right to prevent the data controller from exploiting such data for direct 
marketing purposes,169 the right to require data controllers to ensure that no 
decision taken by them which significantly affects the data subject is based 
solely on the processing by automatic means of such data,170 and the right to 
require data controllers to rectify, block, erase or destroy such data in certain 
circumstances.171 Additionally, the Bill confers on data subjects a right to 
compensation from the data controller for any damage arising from any 
contravention of their data processing obligations.172 These rights have been 
formulated in precisely the same terms in the Bill as their corresponding rights 
in the DPA 1998.173  
Makulilo has drawn attention to significant deficiencies in this piece of 
legislation, particularly when it is compared to the U.K. DPA.174 He points out, 
for instance, that unlike the DPA 1998, it is not entirely clear whether the Bill 
is intended to regulate the public sector, the private sector, or both.175 He also 
indicates that even though the Bill, elaborates on what constitutes “sensitive 
personal data,”176 the Bill does not contain any of the extra safeguards 
surrounding the processing of such data that have been provided for in the 
U.K. DPA.177 
In addition, Makulilo notes that while the Bill, like its U.K. counterpart, 
seeks to preclude the transfer of personal data from Nigeria to other countries 
that do not ensure an adequate level of protection,178 the Bill does not stipulate 
                                                          
167 Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011), § 2 (Nigeria). 
168 Id. § 3. 
169 Id. § 4. 
170 Id. § 5. 
171 Id. § 7. 
172 Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011), § 6 (Nigeria). 
173 See Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29 (Eng.) (where the corresponding sections are: § 8 (right of 
access); § 10 (right to require data controller to cease processing); § 11 (right to prevent processing 
for direct marketing purposes); § 12 (right in relation to automatic decision taking); § 14 (right to 
rectification etc.) and; § 13 (right to compensation)). 
174 Makulilo, supra note 4, at 25−27. 
175 Id. at 25. 
176 See Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011), § 10 (Nigeria); Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, § 2 
(Eng.). 
177 Makulilo, supra note 4, at 26. 
178 See Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011), § 1(4) (Nigeria); Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, sched. 
1 (Eng.) (the eight data protection principles). 
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who should carry out the “adequacy” assessment, how this should be done, and 
according to which criteria,179 even though these matters were addressed at 
some length by the DPA 1998.180 Makulilo also points out that most national 
data protection statutes (including the UK DPA) contain exemptions 
respecting processing of personal data for a variety of public interest purposes, 
like national security, law enforcement, and journalistic integrity,181 but there 
are no such exemptions in the 2011 Bill.182  
Most importantly, Makulilo highlights the fact that in marked contrast to 
the DPA 1998, and most other data privacy legislation around the world, the 
Bill contains no provision for a data protection authority or commission to 
oversee its operation.183 He makes the valid point that this omission “weakens 
the Nigerian Bill significantly to the extent of falling short of international 
standards.”184 Makulilo is entirely correct when he concludes that “[i]n its 
present formulation, Nigeria’s Data Protection Bill presents a weak standard 
of legislation in comparison to other jurisdictions in Africa and beyond.”185 The 
various inadequacies in the Bill are further compounded by its lack of 
recognition of various other key aspects of the DPA 1998, including the 
registration and notification requirements set out in Part III, the enforcement 
mechanisms provided in Part V, or the criminal offenses and monetary 
penalties specified in Part VI. All in all, the 2011 Bill is an amateurish piece of 
draft legislation that poorly reflects the principal legislative organ of one of 
Africa’s leading nations.  
D. The Electronic Transactions (Establishment) Bill 2013  
The very obvious shortcomings of the Data Protection Bill 2011 clearly 
suggest that it was drafted without due care or a proper understanding of the 
U.K. data protection regime on which the Bill was modeled. Having produced 
such a woefully unsatisfactory Bill at their first attempt, the Nigerian National 
Assembly should have devoted a great deal more time and effort to devising a 
more comprehensive piece of legislation that would not just outline the basic 
duties imposed on data controllers by the data protection principles and the 
accompanying rights conferred on data subjects, but also provide the 
administrative machinery and enforcement processes that would underpin the 
operation of the legislation. This has, however, proved to be something of a 
                                                          
179 Makulilo, supra note 4, at 26. 
180 See Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, scheds. 1, 4 (Eng.). 
181 Id. § 28 (national security exemption); § 29 (law enforcement exemption); § 32 (exemption 
relating to journalistic, literary, and artistic materials). 
182 Makulilo, supra note 4, at 26. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 27. 
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forlorn hope since the Electronic Transactions Bill 2013 does not represent 
much of an improvement on the Data Protection Bill 2011.   
The 2013 Bill is more compendious in scope than the 2011 Bill. The 2013 
Bill covers not only data protection, but also a variety of other contemporary 
legal issues pertaining to electronic communications such as the effect of the 
requirements of writing and signature on electronic documents, principles 
governing the formation of electronic contracts, and consumer protection 
issues.186  
The arrangement of sections that precedes the main body of the 2013 Bill 
indicates that Part IV, which deals with data protection, consists of sections 19 
to 27,187 whereas in the main body of the bill itself, Part IV actually consists of 
sections 17 to 25.188 The presence of such an egregious error in a draft Bill laid 
before Nigeria’s highest legislative body is utterly indefensible and calls into 
question the lack of attention to detail and the caliber of the legislative drafters 
working for the National Assembly. Of even greater concern is the fact that in 
attempting to shoehorn such a broad and diverse spectrum of matters into a 
single legislative instrument, the drafters of the 2013 Bill devoted a meager 
nine sections to their legal and regulatory scheme for the protection of personal 
data.189 This is inadequate and absurd, given the complex, convoluted and 
rapidly evolving nature of this area of law. It would have been preferable if the 
drafters had devoted resources to producing a separate bill specifically 
designed to regulate the sphere of data protection in a meticulous, 
comprehensive, and meaningful manner.  
 Instead, Part IV of the 2013 Bill (like the 2011 Bill) is primarily concerned 
with outlining the data protection principles that data controllers (or data 
holders as they are referred to here) must observe190 and specifying the rights 
                                                          
186 Electronic Transactions Bill, S.B 248 (2013), § 1 (Nigeria). The relevant section provides: 
This Bill is to provide a legal and regulatory framework for:  
 (a) conducting transactions using electronic or related media;  
 (b) the protection of the rights of consumers and other parties in electronic 
transactions and services;  
 (c) the protection of personal data; and 
 (d) facilitating electronic commerce in Nigeria. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. Part IV, §§ 17−25. 
189 Id. §§ 17−25. 
190 Id. § 18 (1) (conditions for the processing of personal data); § 18 (2)−(7) (other data protection 
principles that data holders must comply with); § 19 (conditions for the processing of sensitive 
personal data by data holders); §§ 23−24 (obligation of data holder to ensure that appropriate 
technical and organizational requirements are in place to protect personal data). 
44 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 26:13 
 
exercisable by data subjects (referred to in this context as data owners).191 Of 
particular interest is the fact that the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and 
eighth data protection principles outlined in Schedule 1 of the DPA 1998 have 
been re-enacted virtually word-for-word in the 2013 Bill.192 Moreover, a variant 
of the seventh data protection principle is provided for elsewhere in the 2013 
Bill.193 It is somewhat surprising that having provided for seven of the eight 
data protection principles set out in the DPA 1998, the relevant sections of the 
2013 Bill make no specific reference to the requirement that data must be 
processed fairly and lawfully, which forms the basis of the first data protection 
principle.194 Schedule 1(1) of the DPA 1998 provides that in order for personal 
data to be processed fairly and lawfully, at least one of the conditions set out 
in Schedule 2 must be met.195 All these conditions have been reproduced almost 
verbatim in the 2013 Bill.196 Therefore it is rather perplexing that there is 
                                                          
191 Electronic Transactions Bill, S.B 248 (2013), § 20 (Nigeria). 
192 Id. § 18(2)−(7). The relevant subsections of the Bill provide as follows: 
(2) Personal data shall be obtained only for specified and lawful purposes, and 
shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with those 
purposes. 
(3) Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to 
the purposes for which they are processed.  
(4) Personal data shall be provided accurately and, where necessary, kept up 
to date. 
(5) Personal data processed for whatever purpose, shall not be kept for longer 
than required. 
(6) Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data 
owners under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
(7) Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria unless that country or territory provides adequate 
level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data owners in relation to the 
processing of personal data. 
193 Id § 23(1) (“A data holder must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures 
and exercise reasonable care to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction 
or accidental loss and against unauthorized alteration, processing, disclosure or access . . . and 
against all other unlawful forms of processing.”). 
194 Id. §§ 18, 23. 
195 See Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, sched. 1(1) (a) (Eng.). 
196 Electronic Transactions Bill, S.B 248 § 18(1) (Nigeria). This subsection provides as follows: 
Personal data shall only be processed if at least one of the following conditions 
met: 
(a)The data owner has given his consent to the processing.  
(b) The processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the 
data owner is a party, or for the taking of steps at the request of the data owner 
with a view to entering into a contract. 
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nothing whatsoever in the 2013 Bill linking these conditions to the 
requirement in the first data protection principle that data must be fairly and 
lawfully processed.  
One material difference between the 2011 Bill and the 2013 Bill is that the 
2013 Bill (like the DPA 1998) identifies a number of contexts in which 
processing of personal data is exempt from the strict requirements of the 
legislation. Such exemptions include processing that occurs in the realms of 
public safety, defense, national security, law enforcement, crime prevention, 
and protection or where processing is undertaken by natural persons in the 
course of their personal or domestic activities.197 At the same time, however, 
there are certain other important exemptions contained in the DPA 1998 that 
do not appear in the 2013 Bill.198 It is also noteworthy that sections of the 2013 
Bill, which set out the rights exercisable by data subjects,199 have inexplicably 
omitted three of the rights specified in the DPA 1998 as well as the 2011 Bill. 
These are the right to prevent data controllers from exploiting personal data 
for direct marketing purposes,200 the right to require data controllers to ensure 
that no decision taken by them which significantly affects the data subject is 
based solely on the processing by automatic means of personal data,201 and the 
                                                          
(c) The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to 
which the data holder is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. 
[sic] 
(d) The processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
owner. 
(e) The processing is necessary in the interest of the public and good 
governance.    
197 Id. § 17(2). The relevant subsection of the Bill provides that the subsections of the Bill “shall 
not apply to the processing of personal data: 
 (a) in the course of an activity concerning public safety, defence [or] national 
security; 
 (b) concern[ing] the activities of law enforcement, intelligence or prosecuting 
agencies in areas of criminal law; 
 (c) by a natural person in the course of personal or domestic activity.” Id. The 
U.K. DPA contains analogous provisions. Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, §§ 
28, 29, 36 (Eng.) (referring to national security, crime prevention and detection, 
and domestic purposes). 
198 Exemptions that are not covered by the Electronic Transactions Bill 2013, even though they are 
provided for in the DPA 1998, include exemptions relating to the processing of personal data for 
journalistic, literary, or artistic purposes (§ 32) or research purposes (§ 33); the processing of 
personal data in circumstances covered by parliamentary privilege (§ 35A) as well as various 
miscellaneous exemptions set out in sched. 7 (§ 37). 
199 Electronic Transactions Bill, S.B 248 (2013), §§ 20−23 (Nigeria). 
200 Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, § 11 (Eng.); Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011), § 4 (Nigeria). 
201 See Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, § 12 (Eng.); Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011), § 5 
(Nigeria). 
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right to require data controllers to rectify, block, erase, or destroy personal 
data in certain circumstances.202   
Finally, the 2013 Bill provides that the Nigerian National Information 
Technology Development Agency (“NITDA”) “may in consultation with any 
appropriate regulatory body, develop rules and guidelines for Data Protection 
in Nigeria.”203 This is consonant with powers conferred on NITDA by the 
National Information Technology Development Agency Act 2007, which 
provides in this connection that NITDA will play a key role in advising “on 
ways of promoting the development of information technology in Nigeria 
including introducing appropriate information technology legislation.”204 
NITDA has accordingly prepared several sets of draft Guidelines on Data 
Protection, the most recent being Version 4.0, which was produced in 
September 2013.205 It is not entirely clear what the precise legal status of the 
NITDA Guidelines will be if, and when, they are eventually enacted. In any 
case, the NITDA Guidelines add very little of significance to the provisions of 
the 2013 Bill, other than requiring any organization engaged in the processing 
of personal data: (1) to implement effective privacy policies and procedures and 
publish such policies publicly;206 (2) to undertake detailed benchmark 
assessments of such policies;207 and (3) to designate an employee as its Data 
Security Officer to be responsible for adherence to these data protection 
policies and procedures and for effective data protection and management 
within the organization.208 
The NITDA Guidelines have also taken steps towards plugging a gap in 
the 2013 Bill by setting out some criteria for determining whether countries 
outside Nigeria provide an adequate level of protection for data export 
purposes.209 However, it is noteworthy that the NITDA Guidelines do not 
dispense with the need for the recipient country to ensure an adequate level of 
protection where alternative mechanisms for safeguarding data exports (such 
as the binding corporate rules and model contractual clauses) are put in place. 
This could easily have been done by including in the Guidelines, provisions 
                                                          
202 See Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, § 14 (Eng.); Data Protection Bill, H.B. 45 (2011), § 7 
(Nigeria). 
203 Electronic Transactions Bill, S.B 248 (2013), § 25 (Nigeria). 
204 See Nigerian National Information Technology Development Act, Chapter N156 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2010 (Nigeria)) § 6(1). 
205 NAT’L INFO. TECH. DEV. AGENCY, GUIDELINES ON DATA PROTECTION VERSION 4.0 (2013), 
nitademo.azurewebsite.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Guidelines-On-Data-Protection-Final-
Draft-3.4.Pdf [hereinafter NITDA Guidelines].  
206 Id. § 2.1.6. 
207 Id. § 3.1.2. 
208 Id. § 3.1.1. 
209 Id. §§ 2.2.5−7. 
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along the lines of Article 26(2) of the EU DPD210 or Schedule 4 (8) and (9) of 
the DPA 1998.211 It is true that the NITDA Guidelines provide that if a 
requirement exists to send or transfer data outside Nigeria, data controllers 
should consider whether the data is “being processed outside of the [sic] 
Nigeria by another office of the same firm which is established within Nigeria,” 
and should also consider whether there is “a contract in place between the data 
controller and the receiving organization providing for adequate protection of 
personal data.”212 Significantly, the NITDA Guidelines do not go on to stipulate 
that the need for the recipient country to ensure an adequate level of protection 
will be relaxed in circumstances where the Nigerian office and the office 
outside Nigeria, to which the data is being exported, are both subject to 
adequate uniform corporate rules pertaining to the protection of personal data 
or where the contract in question confers an adequate degree of protection on 
the data that is being exported. 
Although the 2013 Bill includes several features one might expect in a 
modern data protection regime, as opposed to the 2011 Bill (especially when 
read in conjunction with the draft NITDA Guidelines), it is still no more than 
a pale imitation of the DPA 1998. The 2013 Bill does not go very far towards 
remedying the defects in the 2011 Bill and, in particular, makes no provision 
for the establishment of a data protection authority. Further, the 2013 Bill 
ignores the numerous proposals for reforming the EU DPD contained in the 
EU GDPR. 213  
These proposed reforms, which are to be implemented in May 2018, will 
have a significant impact on the current state of data protection law 
throughout the EU, both from the standpoints of the data subject and the data 
controller. On the one hand, the rights of data subjects will be strengthened by 
measures like: (a) the introduction of a significantly higher threshold for 
proving data subjects have consented to the processing of their personal 
data,214 (b) the conferment of a “right to be forgotten” on data subjects when 
they no longer want their personal data to be processed and there is not 
legitimate need to retain said data,215 and (c) the conferment of a “right of data 
portability” which will entitle data subjects whose personal data has been 
processed by electronic means to transfer such data into another electronic 
processing system without hindrance from the data controller.216 
                                                          
210 EU DPD, art. 26(2). 
211 Data Protection Act, 1998, c 29, sched. 4(8)−(9) (Eng.). 
212 See Nigerian National Information Technology Development Act (2007) Cap. (N156), § 4.1.8. 
213 See EU GDPR, Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1. 
214 Id. at art. 4(11). 
215 Id. at art. 17. 
216 Id. at art. 20. 
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In addition to strengthening the rights of data subjects, the regulation will 
also increase the levels of responsibility and accountability demanded from 
data controllers. Specifically, this regulation will require data controllers to: 
(a) notify the relevant data protection authorities and data subjects of serious 
data breaches,217 (b) carry out data protection impact assessments when 
engaged in processing operations that present specific risks,218 (c) appoint 
specialist data protection officers in certain circumstances such as where the 
data controller is a public authority,219 (d) implement appropriate technical 
and organizational measures and procedures and integrate safeguards into 
processing designed to protect the rights of data subjects (privacy by design),220 
and (e) ensure privacy-friendly default settings are available to data subjects 
(privacy by default).221   
Since these proposed reforms, which were intended to modernize the data 
protection statutes of EU Member States, including the DPA 1998, were first 
made public in January 2012,222 the drafters of the 2013 bill should have given 
serious consideration to whether any of these reforms could have been 
incorporated into this bill.  
E. The Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (Circa 2013)  
There appears to be no formal record of the Personal Information and Data 
Protection Bill (“PIDP Bill”)223 in the list of proposed legislative measures 
emanating from the Nigerian National Assembly. Unlike the three bills 
considered above, the true provenance of the PIDP Bill is not entirely certain, 
although it appears from available media reports that it was drafted by a 
Committee on Personal Information and Data Protection Legislation, 
operating under the auspices of the National Identity Management 
Commission.224 The Commission’s main purpose is to carry out the enrollment 
                                                          
217 Id. at arts. 33−34. 
218 EU GDPR, Regulation 2016/679 supra, note 1, at art. 35. 
219 Id. at art. 37. 
220 Id. at art. 25(1).  
221 Id. at art. 25(2). 
222 See Gerrit Hornung, A General Data Protection Regulation for Europe? Light and Shade in the 
Commission’s Draft of 25 January 2012, 9(1) SCRIPTED 64, 64 (2012), https://script-ed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/hornung.pdf.  
223 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013) (Nigeria). 
224 See Onyebuchi Ezigbo, Bill to Safeguard Personal Information Underway, BIZCOMMUNITY (Feb. 
25, 2013), http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/410/15/89761.html; see also Proposed Draft Bill 
on Personal Information and Data Protection (Excerpts from a keynote address by Mr. Mohammed 
Bello Adoke, SAN, CFR Hon. Attorney-General of Federation & Minister of Justice and Minister of 
Justice at the stakeholders workshop on the draft bill on personal information and data protection 
in Abuja), para. 1, DIGITAL SENSE NEWS (Feb. 5, 2014), 
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of Nigerian citizens and legal residents, issue National Identity smart cards to 
enrollees, and create and manage a national identity database.225 Section 31(2) 
of the National Identity Management Commission Act 2007 empowers the 
Commission to make regulations providing for the collection, collation, and 
processing of data and other relevant information.226 It is presumably on the 
strength of this authority that it constituted the Committee to prepare the 
PIDP Bill.227 It is not entirely clear when the bill was first drafted, but it came 
prominently into the public eye early in 2013 when the Commission convened 
a “Stakeholder’s Conference” to deliberate on its provisions.228 
The most intriguing feature of the PIDP Bill is that it has completely 
forsaken the model of the DPA 1998 and has instead been modeled very closely 
on Canada’s PIPEDA.229 The drafters of the PIDP Bill may have been attracted 
to the Canadian model because Canada has a federal system of government 
similar to Nigeria.230 Canada’s Bill has thus taken account of the constitutional 
allocation of legislative powers between Canada’s Federal Parliament and its 
provincial Legislative Assemblies. Specifically, “PIPEDA was designed to work 
in tandem with provincial legislation” and “contemplates the harmonization of 
provincial and federal privacy protection.”231 
With this in mind, PIPEDA provides that where provincial legislation has 
been enacted with substantial similarity to PIPEDA, Canada’s Governor-
General may exempt organizations and activities that are subject to such 
provincial legislation from the operation of PIPEDA, with respect to the 
                                                          
http://digitalsenseafrica.blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/proposed-draft-bill-on-personal.html?m=0> 
[hereinafter Proposed Draft Bill on Personal Information and Data Protection]. 
225 See About Us, NAT’L IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION (2007), 
http://www.nimc.gov.ng/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). 
226 National Identity Management Commission Act, Chapter N154 Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 2010 (Nigeria), § 31(2).   
227 See Proposed Draft Bill on Personal Information and Data Protection, supra note 224 
(highlighting the role of this committee in preparing the Personal Information and Data Protection 
Bill). 
228 See Ezigbo, supra note 224 (reporting on the Stakeholders Conference in which the bill was 
discussed). 
229 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5 (Can.). 
230 See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 5, §§ 91 
& 92 (Can.) (“Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed 
their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion…”); cf. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999) § 
2(2) (“Nigeria shall be a Federation consisting of States and a Federal Capital Territory”). 
231 FRANCE HOULE & LORNE SOSSIN, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., POWERS AND 
FUNCTIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENTS ACT: AN EFFECTIVENESS STUDY 114 (2010) (Houle and Sossin are two leading 
Canadian scholars who were commissioned by the Canadian Privacy Commissioner to evaluate 
whether the Ombudsman model provided by Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act 
was effective in regulating data privacy in Canada).    
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collection, use, and disclosure of personal information within that province.232 
Bastarache comments on the effect of this provision, stating, “PIPEDA 
contains federal-provincial cooperation mechanisms with regard to the 
protection of personal information. In essence, opting out of the application of 
PIPEDA for intra-provincial personal information practices is possible for 
provinces who have provincial legislation substantially similar to PIPEDA.”233 
The drafters of the PIDP Bill inserted an almost identical provision, although 
in view of the fact that Nigeria—unlike Canada—is not a constitutional 
monarchy with a Governor-General, but a fully-fledged republic, the Nigerian 
President exercises the power of exemption instead.234  
Another consideration which may have helped sway the drafters of the 
PIDP Bill towards the Canadian model was that the PIPEDA regime had been 
adjudged by the European Commission to confer an adequate level of 
protection on data processed in Canada.235 This exempts Canada from the 
restrictions imposed by Article 25 of the EU DPD on the transfer of personal 
data from the EU to non-EU Member States. 236 It is conceivable that those 
responsible for the Nigerian Bill naively assumed that if the Nigerian 
Legislature re-enacted PIPEDA almost verbatim, the Commission would make 
a positive finding of adequacy in Nigeria's favor thereby facilitating the free 
flow of personal data from the EU to Nigeria with all its attendant commercial 
advantages.  
Like PIPEDA, the PIDP Bill applies to organizations that collect, use, or 
disclose personal information in the course of their commercial activities.237 It 
also applies in circumstances where organizations collect, use, or disclose 
personal information pertaining to their employees in connection with a 
federal work, undertaking, or business.238 The PIDP Bill, however, exempts 
                                                          
232 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c. 5, § 26(2) (b) 
(Can.). 
233 MICHEL BASTARACHE, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PIPEDA: A RE-CONSIDERATION IN THE WAKE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S RE-REFERENCE SECURITIES ACT (2012), 
http://accessprivacy.s3.amazonawa.com/m-bastarache-june-2012-contitutionality-pipeda-paper-
2.pdf (citing the Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act § 26(2) (Can.)); see also 
Jeremy Warner, The Right to Oblivion: Data Retention from Canada to Europe in Three Backward 
Steps, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 75, 93 (2005) (explaining that § 26(2) gives rise to a “relationship 
of mutual exclusivity” between the Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act at the 
federal level and substantially similar provincial laws).  
234 See Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), § 28(2) (Nigeria). 
235 See Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided by the 
Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2002 O.J. (L2) 13.  
236 See EU DPD, art. 25 (1) & 25(2). 
237 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), § 2(1) (Nigeria); Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5, § 4(1) (Can.). 
238 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), § 2(1) (Nigeria). 
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government institutions, any information that an individual collects, uses, or 
discloses exclusively for personal or domestic purposes, and any organization 
with respect to personal information it uses exclusively for journalistic, 
artistic, or literary purposes.239  
The PIDP Bill requires all non-exempt organizations to comply with 
obligations set out in Schedule 1, which contains a set of ten privacy principles 
that are virtually identical to the ten principles in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA.240 
These principles were originally part of the Privacy Framework set out in the 
Canadian Standards Association’s 1996 Model Code for the Protection of 
Personal Information.241 They require these organizations to seek the consent 
of individuals when collecting, using, or disclosing personal information 
pertaining to them.242 In much the same way as PIPEDA does, the PIDP Bill 
identifies a wide range of situations in which personal information may be 
collected, used, and disclosed by such organizations without having to obtain 
consent.243 The PIDP Bill also spells out in very similar terms to PIPEDA, the 
entitlement of individuals to request access to personal information relating to 
them, the corresponding obligation on the part of organizations to respond to 
such requests, and a range of circumstances in which access is prohibited or 
may be refused.244  
The PIDP Bill provides precisely the same remedial framework as PIPEDA 
for individuals who allege that an organization has contravened a provision of 
the Bill or violated any of the principles in Schedule 1. The initial course of 
action open to them is to file a complaint with the Privacy Commissioner. The 
nature, scope, and limits of the investigatory, adjudicatory, and other powers 
exercisable by the Commissioner in response to such complaints are more or 
less identical in both cases.245 The PIDP Bill also specifies exactly the same 
                                                          
239 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), § 2(2) (Nigeria); Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5, § 4(2) (Can.). 
240 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), § 3(1) (Nigeria) (mirroring Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5, § 5(1) (Can.)).  
241 CAN. STANDARDS ASS’N, MODEL CODE FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
CAN/CSA-Q380-96 (1996), http://simson.net/ref/1996/CSA_Privacy_Standard_CSA-Q830-96.pdf. 
242 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), sched. 1, princ. 3 (Nigeria) (mirroring 
PIPEDA, supra note 8, at sched.1, princ. 3).  
243 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), § 5 (Nigeria); Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5, § 7 (Can.). 
244 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), §§ 7–9 (Nigeria); Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5, §§ 8–10 (Can.). 
245 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), §§ 10−14 (Nigeria); Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5, §§ 11−13 (Can.). It is particularly 
noteworthy in this connection that both the Personal Information and Data Protection Bill § 12(2) 
and Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act § 12(1) (2) explicitly empower 
the Commissioner to “attempt to resolve complaints by means of dispute resolution mechanisms 
such as mediation and conciliation.” 
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procedure for judicial recourse upon receipt of the Commissioner’s report or 
upon notification that the commissioner discontinued the complaint. The 
remedies available to the court are also identical in both pieces of legislation.246  
In embracing the Canadian model almost completely, the PIDP Bill’s 
Nigerian proponents demonstrated no awareness of the groundswell of 
legitimate concerns and trenchant criticisms evoked by PIPEDA from its 
inception. In the first place, the drafters of the PIDP Bill chose to replicate 
mutatis mutandis, the formula in Article 26(2)(b) of PIPEDA, whereby 
PIPEDA could be excluded from applying to the processing of personal 
information within those Canadian provinces with substantially similar 
legislation.247 In doing so, the Nigerian Legislature seems to have overlooked 
the fact that the constitutionality of PIPEDA has been disputed in various 
quarters on the ground that it breaches the scheme for the distribution of 
legislative powers established in the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867.248 As 
Lawford points out, “PIPEDA took an interesting tack on the question of 
federal jurisdiction over privacy,” and in doing so, it “seem[ed] to infringe 
significantly upon provincial constitutional competence.”249 The ensuing 
controversy has not yet been fully resolved by the Canadian judiciary, which 
should have given the drafters of the PIDP Bill pause when seeking to adopt 
the Canadian model. 
Secondly, there is a fairly widespread perception that PIPEDA is more 
favorable to commercial organizations, whose collection, use, and disclosure of 
personal information PIPEDA seeks to regulate, rather than to the individuals 
whose personal information it ostensibly seeks to protect. Piper, for instance, 
refers to “the disproportionate and anti-democratic importance of business 
interests in the promulgation of the legislation.”250 She argues that the 
interests of the Canadian federal government were closely aligned with the 
self-interest of business groups, which led to legislation that protected the 
short-term needs of business stakeholders, rather than serving as an effective 
vehicle for establishing a long-term privacy framework that would promote the 
                                                          
246 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), §§ 15−18 (Nigeria); Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., c 5, §§ 14−17 (Can.). 
247 See Personal Information and Data Protection Bill (2013), § 28(2) (Nigeria) (“The President 
may, by order, if satisfied that legislation of a State that is substantially similar to this Act applies 
to an organisation, a class of organisations, an activity or a class of activities, exempt the 
organisation, activity or class from the application of this Act in respect of the collection, use or 
disclosure of personal information that occurs within that State”). 
248 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 5, §§ 91 & 
92 (Can.). 
249 JOHN LAWFORD, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CENTER, OTTAWA, CONSUMER PRIVACY UNDER 
PIPEDA: HOW ARE WE DOING? 7 (2004); see also Mahmud Jamal, Is PIPEDA Constitutional?, 43 
CAN. BUS. L. J. 434, 438−39 (2006); BASTARACHE, supra note 233, 1−20.   
250 Tina Piper, The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act: A Lost 
Opportunity to Democratize Canada’s “Technological Society,” 23 DALHOUSIE L.J. 253, 253 (2000). 
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public good.251 Houle and Sossin reiterate this point and indicate that many 
felt the views of private business dominated the debates that preceded the 
enactment of PIPEDA and that the concerns of citizens were not well 
represented in those debates. They argue that this “is paradoxical given that 
the issue of those debates was the fundamental protection of personal 
information.”252 If the drafters of the PIDP Bill had been cognizant of such 
sentiments, they might have considered more carefully whether PIPEDA had 
struck the right balance between these competing imperatives before rushing 
to copy it so uncritically. 
A further complexity arising from the PIPEDA regime relates to Schedule 
1. MacDonnell describes the CSA Model Code,253 as replicated in Schedule 1 of 
the Act, as an almost conversational document that introduces its ten 
principles and then elaborates on them.254 According to McClennan and Schick 
PIPEDA has, as a result, been criticized for a lack of clarity since the 
intermittent use of “shall” and “should” in the model code has meant that some 
of its “ten commandments” are mandatory obligations and others mere 
recommendations.255 This is not a particularly apt way of achieving the 
requisite degree of precision that should be the hallmark of sound legislation. 
Scassa points out that “Schedule 1 . . . consist[s] essentially of a reproduction 
in toto of the [CSA] Model Code . . . . [i]t is clear that a consensus-based 
voluntary code of this nature was never intended to provide the more strict 
normative guidance which one expects of legislation.”256  She further suggests 
that “[a]s a result of the way in which it has been drafted, with the adoption of 
the entire CSA Model Code as the normative heart of the legislation, PI[PE]DA 
is an unwieldy tool for the protection of personal information.”257 This difficulty 
was briefly alluded to in the context of the PIDP Bill by Banisar who asserts 
that it is a “primary concern . . . that the basic principles that govern the law 
have been subjected to a schedule in the back of the law rather than 
[appearing] in the main text.”258 The drafters of the PIDP Bill injudiciously fell 
                                                          
251 Id. at 255.  
252 HOULE & SOSSIN, supra note 231, at 8. 
253 CAN. STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 241.  
254 John MacDonnell, Exporting Trust: Does E-Commerce Need a Canadian Privacy Seal of 
Approval, 39 ALTA. L.R. 346, 373 (2001). 
255 Jennifer McClennan & Vadim Schick, “O, Privacy” Canada’s Importance in the Development of 
the International Data Privacy Regime, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 669, 684 (2006−07).  
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into this trap in spite of the concerns that have been voiced in Canada 
regarding the incorporation of the CSA scheme into Schedule 1.  
Critics have also expressed considerable dissatisfaction regarding the 
perceived weakness of the enforcement mechanisms available under the 
PIPEDA regime. This has recently been acknowledged by the Canadian 
Privacy Commissioner who noted that “[t]he appropriateness of the current 
PIPEDA enforcement model has been the subject of debate prior to the law 
coming into force and in the ensuing years.”259 The problem emerged because 
PIPEDA opted for an Ombudsman model under which the Privacy 
Commissioner had very limited enforcement powers, which excluded order 
making powers and the ability to fine offenders.260 Instead, the conciliatory 
role of the Commissioner encourages parties to solve their differences 
amicably.261 Even though the Commissioner can suggest recommendations to 
the parties, he does not have the power to pronounce enforceable decisions. 
Therefore, respondents are not bound by the outcome.262 Despite the concerns 
raised in Canada, the drafters of the PIDP Bill adopted precisely the same 
procedure. Banisar points out that while individuals are allowed to file 
complaints concerning violations of their rights, under the PIDP Bill “when it 
comes to enforcing these rights, the Commissioner’s remedies seem to be 
limited to resolving complaints through dispute mechanisms such as 
mediation and conciliation.”263 Although an individual or the Commissioner 
may thereafter bring an enforcement action before the Canadian Federal Court 
and the Nigerian Federal High Court respectively,264 Houle and Sossin 
highlight the costs generated by that procedure (over and above the costs of 
any initial complaint) and point out that “the two-step process is long and 
expensive [and] is liable to discourage complainants and reduce the number of 
cases which might be heard by the Federal Court.”265  
 Another major structural criticism is that the PIDP Bill explicitly “does 
not apply to any government institution”266 and has not been supplemented by 
any other legislation regulating the collection, use, and distribution of personal 
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information by government institutions. The corresponding section in PIPEDA 
stipulates that it “does not apply to any government institutions to which the 
Privacy Act applies [emphasis added].”267 This provision is understandable in 
the Canadian statutory scheme since the Canadian Privacy Act of 1985 
contains a parallel data privacy regime designed to “protect the privacy of 
individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by a 
government institution and . . . . provide individuals with a right of access to 
that information.”268 However, there is currently no Nigerian statute 
corresponding to the Canadian Privacy Act. This means that enacting the 
Nigerian Bill in its current form would have the undesirable effect of placing 
public institutions above the law when it comes to data protection. 
Commenting on this state of affairs, Banisar asserts that: 
[t]he most significant flaw in the law is its apparent application 
only to the private sector . . . . This is a serious problem given 
the lack of a detailed law on the collection, use and disclosure 
of personal information law in Nigeria. It leaves mostly 
unprotected from abuse the records of millions of citizens 
including the medical records, identity information and 
anything else held by public bodies.269  
The mechanical manner in which PIPEDA has been copied by the PIDP 
Bill has also given rise to one or two relatively minor, but nonetheless 
irritating, drafting anomalies. The first concerns the definition of “personal 
health information” in PIPEDA270 that is repeated verbatim in the definition 
section of the PIDP Bill.271 The reason why it was necessary for this definition 
to appear in PIPEDA was because it contained transitional provisions 
providing for its operation to be phased into the health sector. Therefore, 
PIPEDA stipulated that it would only affect personal health information 
collected, used, or disclosed by an organization one year after the day on which 
PIPEDA was enacted.272 By contrast, the PIDP Bill does not include any 
corresponding transitional provisions, and since there is no reference to 
personal health information anywhere else within the bill, its inclusion in the 
definition section is entirely superfluous and constitutes a rather careless 
oversight.  
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The second drafting anomaly that is evident in the PIDP Bill arises from 
the fact that the privacy principles set out in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA are serially 
enumerated from 4.1 to 4.10. This particular form of enumeration is 
attributable to the fact that the principles originate from Part 4 of the CSA 
Model Code that was incorporated verbatim into this Schedule.273 Indeed, this 
is explicitly acknowledged in PIPEDA Schedule 1, which is entitled “Principles 
Set Out in the National Standard of Canada Entitled Model Code for the 
Protection of Personal Information, CAN/CSA-Q830-96.”274 The drafters of the 
PIDP Bill adopted the same form of enumeration in PIPEDA’s Schedule 1, and 
the seemingly random reference to Principles 4.1 to 4.10 in the Nigerian 
version will likely be a source of confusion as the connection to the CSA Model 
code is not made clear in the Schedule. Therefore, Banisar is justified in 
asserting “[o]verall, the bill is poorly drafted and includes many inconsistent 
and conflicting provisions as well as a general difficulty in understanding 
which will seriously undermines its effectiveness.”275 
  Furthermore, after the PIDP Bill was initially introduced, the Canadian 
Parliament enacted the Digital Privacy Act.276 This Act amended the version 
of PIPEDA that formed the basis of the Nigerian version in several significant 
respects. For example, the Act strengthened the consent requirement in 
PIPEDA by specifying that such consent will now be valid, only if it is 
reasonable to expect that an individual to whom the organization’s activities 
are directed would understand the nature, purposes, and consequences of the 
collection, use, or disclosure of the personal information to which they are 
consenting.277 Another key provision of the new Act makes it incumbent on 
organizations to report to the Privacy Commissioner any breach of security 
safeguards involving personal data under their control, if there is reason to 
believe that the breach creates a significant risk of harm to an individual.278 
Moreover, the 2015 Act fortifies the relatively weak enforcement procedures in 
PIPEDA, by equipping the Privacy Commissioner with an additional means of 
prevailing on organizations engaged in the processing of personal information 
to adhere to their PIPEDA obligations.279 More specifically, it empowers the 
Commissioner to enter into compliance agreements with organizations that he 
or she has reason to believe have committed, or are likely to commit, breaches 
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of PIPEDA.280 Such agreements may contain any terms the Commissioner 
deems necessary and the Commissioner may, if the need arises, go to court to 
ensure compliance with the agreement.281 Even though many of the 
amendments in the Digital Privacy Act were available to the public and were 
being discussed in Canadian legal reform circles at the time the Nigerian draft 
was produced, the discussion did not come to the attention of the drafters of 
the PIDP. It follows that if the PIDP is enacted in its current form, it will not 
benefit from any of the recent modifications to PIPEDA. 
The inadequacy of the PIDP Bill becomes even more obvious when it is 
contrasted with Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (“the 
Singaporean Act”), which also bears some of the hallmarks of the Canadian 
PIPEDA model.282 For example, the declared purpose of the Singaporean Act 
is virtually the same as that set out in PIPEDA.283 Again, it is noticeable that 
the objective standard of “what a reasonable person would consider 
appropriate in the circumstances” against which PIPEDA evaluates the 
collection, use, and disposal of personal information has also found its way into 
the Singaporean Act.284 
Despite such similarities, the Singaporean Act has sought to mitigate some 
of the more unsalutary features of PIPEDA. First, instead of merely 
incorporating the vague, nebulous mish-mash of obligatory principles and 
mere recommendations that make up the CSA Model Code, the Singaporean 
approach has been to distill them into a precisely drafted set of general rules 
that are contained in Parts III−VI.285 Second, under the Singaporean Act, the 
Personal Data Protection Commission possesses much greater powers of 
enforcement against errant organizations than the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner does under PIPEDA.286 There is some scope for mediation built 
into the enforcement provisions of the Singaporean Act,287 but the Commission 
is also given the power to review, countermand, or disallow decisions 
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concerning refusals to provide access to personal data, to charge fees for such 
access, or to correct erroneous personal data.288 The Commission is also vested 
with the power to stop errant organizations from “collecting, using or disclosing 
personal data . . . .” and may also require organizations “to destroy personal 
data collected . . .” by them, and to pay financial penalties of up to $1 million.289  
The authors of the Singaporean Act have also ventured beyond the 
legislative terrain staked out by PIPEDA in various other significant respects. 
For instance, unlike PIPEDA, which does not contain any specific adequacy 
provisions relating to data exports, the Singaporean Act explicitly curtails the 
transfer of personal data to other countries that do not provide sufficient 
protections for personal data so transferred. This provision is similar to the 
adequacy requirements specified by the United Kingdom’s eighth data 
protection principle and Article 25(1) of the EU DPD.290 Again, unlike PIPEDA, 
the Singaporean Act creates an elaborate appellate structure to deal with data 
protection disputes. Organizations or individuals that are aggrieved by the 
Commission’s decisions and directions may bring their case to a special Data 
Protection Appeal Panel established under the Singaporean Act.291 Further, a 
channel is provided for additional appeals to the High Court and beyond.292 A 
comparison of the Singaporean Act and the PIDP Bill suggests that Singapore’s 
legislators are more highly sophisticated and much more adept at negotiating 
the niceties and complexities of legal transplantation than their Nigerian 
counterparts. 
F. The Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015 
The Cybercrimes Act 2015 is concerned with the prohibition, prevention, 
detection, prosecution, and punishment of cybercrimes.293. In addition, 
however, the Act specifies that one of its objectives is “[t]he protection of . . . 
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data and computer programs, intellectual property and privacy rights,” 
thereby conveying the impression that regulation of data privacy is one of its 
chief concerns.294 This impression is reinforced by a subsequent section of the 
Cybercrimes Act ostensibly concerned with “[r]ecords retention and protection 
of data.”295 A closer look at this section, however, reveals that this reference to 
“protection of data” is somewhat misleading since the main thrust of the 
section is not to safeguard the interests of data subjects. Rather, the focus of 
this section of the Cybercrimes Act is to assist the nation’s law enforcement 
agencies in tackling cybercrimes by ensuring that providers of digital services 
(1) retain and preserve any traffic data, subscriber information, and content 
data pertaining to their users for at least two years and (2) make such 
information available at the request of these agencies.296  
Although the Cybercrimes Act focuses on tackling cybercrime, the Act also 
ostensibly provides basic protections for individual data subjects. Specifically, 
the Act insists that personal information “shall not be utilized except for 
legitimate purposes,”297 and that data users must respect individual privacy 
rights as established in the Nigerian Constitution. Further, the Act requires 
that data processors take appropriate steps to maintain the confidentiality of 
data retained, processed, or retrieved for law enforcement purposes.298 
However, these protective provisions are severely curtailed because the Act 
goes on to stipulate that every provider of digital services must disclose any 
information requested by any law enforcement agency, without introducing 
any accompanying safeguards like judicial or administrative oversight.299 
Thus, it seems, contrary to the perceived objective of protecting privacy rights, 
the Cybercrimes Act is not designed to enhance the data privacy rights of 
individuals in any meaningful way. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the age of global conquest and colonization has now receded into 
history, in the case of Nigeria, the laws transplanted during the colonial period 
have exhibited a remarkable degree of longevity. In particular, the ongoing 
quest for a suitable data protection regime reveals that the present-day 
Nigerian legal system remains deeply tied to its colonial heritage. Further, 
Nigeria’s regulatory authorities are still instinctively primed to seek legislative 
solutions from the “motherland” when confronted with complex new challenges 
arising from modern technology. The approach adopted by the Nigerian 
National Assembly when it has relied on English law has been disappointing. 
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Simply churning out bills like the Data Protection Bill 2011 and the Electronic 
Transactions Bill 2013 that merely replicate key aspects of the U.K. DPA 1998 
reflect poorly on the creativity and perspicacity of Nigeria’s legislators. It is 
also unfortunate that the Nigerian drafters of the 2013 Bill overlooked the fact 
that the EU DPD, which the DPA 1998 sought to implement, is currently in 
the throes of major reform and failed to address such changes in drafting their 
own bill. 
The results have been just as disappointing for the three legislative 
measures not derived from the DPA 1998, namely the Cyber Security and Data 
Protection Agency Bill 2008, the Cybercrimes Act 2015, and the PIDP Bill. The 
Cyber Security and Data Protection Agency Bill 2008 and the Cybercrime Bill 
2015 contain misleading buzzwords like “data protection” and “privacy,” when 
they have done nothing to advance the cause of data privacy in Nigeria.  
The PIDP Bill represents a marked departure from the norm on the 
Nigerian legislative front. Although Nigeria and Canada share the same 
common law heritage, there are no previous examples of the former having 
derived any substantial legislative guidance from the latter. The Nigerian 
legislature’s decision to mimic the Canadian PIPEDA instead of the U.K. DPA 
is valid only so long as all other legislative options have been carefully 
considered. It is “fortunate that laws are not protected by copyrights, so that 
jurisdictions are free to pick and choose as they wish from the plethora of legal 
solutions already applied in other places.”300 Regrettably however, the drafters 
of the PIDP Bill construed this liberty as license to plagiarize the Canadian 
statute on a grand scale and pass it off as the product of their own earnest 
endeavors.301 This matter is made worse because the PIDP Bill does not take 
into account recent Canadian reforms and is therefore nothing more than an 
outdated version of Canadian legislation.  
Nigeria’s regulatory elites have floundered in their attempts to devise a 
workable data protection regime for the nation. It is thus scarcely surprising 
that apart from the Cybercrimes Act 2015, none of their legislative proposals 
have so far made it to the statute book. This is particularly perplexing since 
other African countries such as Ghana and South Africa—which are at a 
similar stage in their legal development—have recently achieved a more 
satisfactory legislative outcome by adopting a more measured and meticulous 
approach to the task at hand.302 An examination of the data protection statutes 
enacted by these two nations reveals they are more coherent, better structured, 
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and far more comprehensive than any of the Nigerian bills because they do not 
simply replicate the contents of statutes in force in other jurisdictions. 
Unpalatable as this might be, it now seems incumbent on Nigeria’s legislators 
to go back to the drawing board, and devote more time, energy, and intellectual 
effort to devising a data protection scheme that is worthy of its name. 
This is not to suggest that Nigerian legislators ought to “reinvent the 
wheel,” as this would consume an inordinate amount of the nation’s limited 
legislative resources. Rather, there are several more feasible courses of action. 
First, they may wish to direct their legislative borrowing towards either Ghana 
or South Africa, since these are two nations which are within the same 
geographic region as Nigeria and whose current social, political, and economic 
circumstances are broadly similar. The main stumbling block here is that the 
Nigerian National Assembly might consider it infra dignitatem to yield in this 
or any other matter to the superior legislative wisdom of the Ghanaian or 
South African parliament. Secondly, given that Nigeria is a leading member of 
both ECOWAS and the AU, it would be perfectly legitimate for its legislators 
to seek to promote sub-regional or regional legal harmonization by devising a 
statutory data protection framework that is closely modeled on the ECOWAS 
Supplementary Act or the AU Convention. A third possibility might be for 
Nigeria to venture further afield and take a leaf out of the statute book of a 
country such as Singapore whose data protection legislation is infused with 
elements of the Canadian PIPEDA regime, while at the same time retaining a 
distinctly Singaporean flavor.  
Whichever foreign model they eventually decide to embrace, the Nigerian 
authorities would do well to pay heed to three eminently sensible 
recommendations put forward by Makulilo.303 The first is that the adoption of 
a data protection law in Africa should not be treated as a mere exercise in “cut 
and paste” of EU law or that of its member states (or indeed any other foreign 
legislation). The second is that the drafting of data protection legislation 
should not be left entirely to government or parliamentary drafting 
departments, but should also involve substantial input from leading experts in 
data protection law. The third is that in enacting data protection legislation, 
African governments must bear in mind that it is not solely a device for 
attracting foreign investment, but also an instrument for safeguarding their 
citizens against the infringement of their privacy rights. 
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